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Recent Cases
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION-UNITED STATES
CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENT FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR
In Re Griffiths1
Fre Le Poole Griffiths, a citizen of the Netherlands, applied for permis-
sion to take the Connecticut bar examination. A local county bar association
refused to grant this permission solely because Ms. Griffiths was not a United
States citizen.2 Ms. Griffiths sought a declaration of eligibility in superior
court; an adverse judgment was affirmed by the Connecticut Supreme
Court.3 Ms. Griffiths appealed to the United States Supreme Court, alleging
that the citizenship requirement constituted a denial of equal protection of
the law under the 14th amendment. The Supreme Court struck down the
citizenship requirement.4
In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners5 the Supreme Court held that
the 14th amendment limits a state's authority to set qualifications required
for admission to the bar.6 Thus, only two questions were before the Court
in Griffiths: (1) What burden must the state sustain to justify the citizenship
requirement, and (2) did Connecticut meet that burden?
Before Griffiths the Supreme Court had held that certain alienage classi-
fications established by state laws were "inherently suspect" under the 14th
1. 418 U.S. 717 (1978). See companion case, Sugarman v. Dougall, 413
U.S. 634 (1973), rejecting alienage classifications for civil servants in New York
as overbroad.
2. Many states have required United States citizenship as a condition for
admission to the bar. Missouri's requirement prior to amendment was typical.
Section 484.040, RSMo 1969, gives the Missouri Supreme Court the exclusive
power to admit and license persons to practice law in Missouri. Prior to Sept. 1,
1972, Mo. SuP. CT. R. 8.05 read in part, "[A]pplicant[s] for examination for
admission to the Bar in this State must be . .. citizen[s] of the United States."
The Rule now provides that applicants be of good moral character and be 21
years of age.
The Attorney General of Missouri has held that a United States citizenship
requirement for licensing doctors is invalid. 27 Mo. ATry GE . OP. 276 (May
22, 1970).
3. 162 Conn. 249, 294 A.2d 281 (1972).
4. 413 U.S. at 718.
5. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
6. 858 U.S. at 238-39. The Connecticut Supreme Court in Griffiths found
that the citizenship requirement met the "rational connection" test of Schware.
See Application of rffiths, 162 Conn. 249, 260, 294 A.2d 281, 286 (1972).
Schware did not control Griffiths because it involved a former member of the
Communist Party who was refused admission to the bar on moral grounds.
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amendment;7 and, therefore, that the state must show a "compelling state
interest" to justify them." Thus, restrictions on an alien's right to employ-
ment,9 to obtain fishing licenses,' 0 to receive welfare,", and to practice cer-
tain professions' 2 constitute denials of equal protection. Several of these
cases, however, involved an alienage classification that tended to impact on
race instead of national allegiance only.13 The Griffiths Court held that
classifications based on alienage are suspect 4 and that the state, to justify
them,
... must show that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally
permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is
'necessary to the accomplishment' of its purpose or the safeguarding
of its interest.' 5
Having established the state's burden of proof, the Court gave its
attention to the question whether Connecticut had met this burden. Com-
mentators'" and cases27 have suggested five justifications for the citizenship
requirement as a condition for admission to the bar. First, it is argued that
an alien is incapable of possessing the required appreciation of the spirit of
American institutions.' 8 Yet, a state cannot exclude a citizen from the legal
profession solely because of his political beliefs concerning American insti-
tutions.'9 Although a state does have a legitimate interest in insuring that
7. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 872 (1971). In 1886 the Supreme
Court held that aliens are "persons" within the meaning of the 14th amendment.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
8. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964). See Clarke v. Decke-
bach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927), in which the Court held that a mere rational basis
will justify an alienage classification.
9. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915). See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S.
634 (1978).
10. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
11. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
12. Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 456 P.2d 645, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 77 (1969).
18. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Although Yick Wo was an
alien, the ordinance he challenged was aimed at discrimination against the Chinese
as a race rather than as a nationality. See also Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n,
334 U.S. 410 (1948), where the classification was aimed at specific nationalities,
not aliens in general, thus giving it the effect of a race classification. In Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 872 (1971), the Court merely stated that classifications
based on alienage were inherently suspect. The authority for this view was taken
from a footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53
n.4 (1938). However, Carolene Products did not concern aliens, and only four
Justices joined in the opinion. See Clark v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927).
Clark is an early Supreme Court case setting a mere rational basis standard for
alienage classifications.
14. 413 U.S. at 721.
15. Id. at 721-22.
16. M. KoNvmrrz, THE ALIEN Am ThE AsIATIcs n-T AimwncAr LAv (1946).
See also Comment, 10 STAN. L. REv. 777, 780 (1958).
17. Application of Park, 484 P.2d 690 (Alas. 1971); Raffaelli v. Comm.
of Bar Examiners, 7 Cal. 3d 288, 496 P.2d 1264, 101 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1972);
In re Chi-dooh Li, 79 Wash. 2d 561, 488 P.2d 259 (1971).
18. Raffaeli v. Comm. of Bar Examiners, 7 Cal.8d 288, 296, 496 P.2d 1264,
1269, 101 Cal. Rptr. 896, 902 (1972).
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a bar applicant has an understanding of the American governmental system,
the exclusion of all aliens does not promote that interest.20
A second justification given is that an alien cannot take the required
oath to support the Constitution because he owes his allegiance to another
country.21 Yet, aliens have long taken this oath upon induction into the
armed services.2 2 In Griffiths the Court found no merit in the contention
that noncitizens could not in good conscience take an oath to support the
Constitution.23 The Court further said that applicants can constitutionally
be required to take the oath sincerely, and that a pro forma mouthing of it
is insufficent.24 This requirement is relevant to an applicant's character, not
his nationality, and is equally applicable to aliens and citizens alike.25
A third argument against allowing aliens to practice law is that an
alien is likely to return to his native land and thus shirk his duty of remain-
ing accessible to his clients.28 Yet, in our highly mobile society lawyers often
move from state to state; in this regard aliens are no more likely to be dere-
lict in their duty of accessibility than are nationals. Further, there is little
basis for believing that an alien who has established a law practice will
suddenly give it up to return to his native soil.
A fourth argument is that the practice of law is a privilege, not a right,
and therefore the state may regulate it freely.27 But, the Supreme Court has
held that the practice of law is a matter of right for one qualified by his
learning and moral character,28 and, more fundamentally, that constitutional
rights do not turn on whether a benefit is characterized as a right or a
privilege.29
The final argument, and the one the Connecticut bar most strongly
relied on, is that a lawyer is an officer of the court and that he should, there-
fore, be a citizen30 Respondents contended that since citizenship is required
of other public officials, citizenship may likewise be required for an attor-
ney.31 They pointed out that citizenship is a prerequisite for many public
offices because of the danger inherent in those with a substantial public
20. Raffaelli v. Comm. of Bar Examiners, 7 Cal. 3d 288, 296, 496 P.2d 1264,
1270, 101 Cal. Rptr. 896, 902 (1972).
21. Application of Park, 484 P.2d 690, 694 (Alas. 1971); Raffaelli v.
Comm. of Bar Examiners, 7 Cal. 8d 288, 297, 496 P.2d 1264, 1270, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 896, 902 (1972).
22. 10 U.S.C. § 502 (1972).
23. 418 U.S. at 726 n.18.
24. Id. at 726.
25. Id.
26. Raffaelli v. Comm. of Bar Examiners, 7 Cal. 3d 288, 299, 496 P.2d 1264,
1271-72, 101 Cal. Rptr. 896, 903-04 (1972).
27. Id. at 299, 496 P.2d at 1272, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
28. Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1, 8 (1971).
29. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971); Schware v. Board of
Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 n.5 (1957). The companion case to Grqffiths,
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 644 (1973), reinforces the rejection of the
right-priviIege dichotomy.
80. Application of Park, 484 P.2d 690, 695 (Alas. 1971); Application of
Griffiths, 162 Conn. 249, 254, 294 A.2d 281, 284-85 (1972); Raffaelli v. Comm.
of Bar Examiners, 7 Cal. 3d 288, 300-01, 496 P.2d 1264, 1273, 101 Cal. Rptr.
896, 905 (1972).
31. 418 U.S. at 728 (1973).
1974]
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responsibility having a divided loyalty.32 The Court noted that most states
use the phrase, "officer of the court," in its figurative sense, instead of its
constitutional or legal sense.33 For example, in Missouri an attorney is an
officer of the court only in the sense that he is responsible to the public for
the proper administration of justice.34 The Missouri courts have held that
the phrase "officer of the court" means only that an attorney will be faithful
to those who may trust him with their causes35 and that he will assist the
court in administering justice.36 Therefore, the lawyer possesses no sub-
stantial public responsibility, and there is no overriding state interest in
minimizing the possibility of a divided loyalty that could prevent an alien
from performing these tasks.37
In Connecticut the situation is somewhat different in that the lawyer
has extraordinary powers.3 8 A Connecticut attorney has authority to sign
writs and subpoenas, take recognizances, administer oaths and take deposi-
tions and acknowledgements of deeds.3 9 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
found that these powers "hardly involve matters of state policy or acts of
such unique responsibility as to entrust them only to citizens," 0 and thus
held that the Connecticut Bar had failed to meet the heavy burden of proof
required of suspect classifications. 41
In his dissent, Mr. Chief Justice Burger conceded the desirability of
letting aliens become members of the bar but felt that there was no con-
stitutional basis for the Court's holding.42 He rejected the majority's suspect
classification test and held that any "rational basis" would uphold the
requirement.43 Furthermore, Mr. Chief justice Burger concluded that the
lawyer is indeed an officer of the court as well as an advocate for his client.4
Agreeing with the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Rehnquist noted that society
places tremendous responsibility and trust on lawyers and, therefore, some-
32. Id. at 724.
83. Id. at 728-29. See Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 405 (1956).
34. In re Sizer, 134 S.W.2d 1085 (Spr. Mo. App. 1939); In re Lacy, 234 Mo.
App. 71, 112 S.W.2d 594 (St. L. Ct. App. 1937); In re H- 5-, 229 Mo. App.
44, 69 S.W.2d 325 (St. L. Ct. App. 1934).
35. State v. Lewis, 9 Mo. App. 321, affd, 74 Mo. 222 (1881).
36. Leimer v. Hulse, 352 Mo. 451, 178 S.W.2d 335 (1944), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 744, rehearing denied, 323 U.S. 814 (1944); Esmor v. Haeussler, 341
Mo. 33, 106 S.W.2d 412, transferred, 234 Mo. App. 217, 115 S.W.2d 54 (St. L.
Ct. Ap .1988).
413 U.S. at
88. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 51-85.
39. 413 U.S. at 724.
40. Id. at 724.
41. Id. at 727.
42. Id. at 730.
48. Id. at 732. The criticism of the rational basis test is that it is so easily
met that the state can justify almost any requirement. See Hoyt v. Florida, 868
U.S. 57, 62 (1968). See also Kanowitz, Constitutional Aspects of Sex-Based
Discrimination in American Law, 48 NEB. L. REv. 131 (1968).
Mr. Chief Justice Burger also suggests that states may constitutionally adopt,
either by law or court rule, reciprocal provisos which would only admit to the bar
nationals of those countries which admit Americans to practice under their legal
systems. 413 U.S. at 738.
44. 418 U.S. at 738.
[Vol. 39
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thing more than technical skills is required-a lawyer needs an under-
standing of the American political and social experience which the alien
cannot obtain without the naturalization process.45 Neither dissenter clarifies
how the naturalization provides this understanding. If it is so necessary for
the practice of law, perhaps all applicants, citizens as well as aliens, should
be tested for this attribute.46
The significance of Griffiths has not yet been fully felt. The citizenship
requirement has impacted not only on aliens who wanted to practice law in
the United States, but has also been detrimental to the general public. The
advice of an alien expert on foreign law has been unavailable because he
was precluded from the practice of law.4 7 Indeed, with expanding world
trade, lawyers capable of practicing law in more than one country will
become especially helpful to their clients. The Court has removed one
impediment toward providing such counsel.
CaunrLs D. SzmEL
CRIMINAL LAW-CAN RETRIAL OF A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT
RESULT IN A HARSHER SENTENCE THAN THAT
IMPOSED IN FIRST TRIAL?
Chaffin v. Stynchcombel
In 1969, Chaffin was tried by a jury in a Georgia state criminal court
for the capital offense of robbery by force or violence. 2 The jury returned
a guilty verdict and sentence of 15 years in prison. On appeal his convicton
was affirmed, but on a subsequent writ of habeas corpus Chaffin was
granted a new trial. Upon retrial with a different judge and jury he was
again found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment. On certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court Chaffin argued that the due process clause of
the 14th amendment bars the jury from rendering a longer sentence on
retrial following the reversal of a prior conviction.
The defendant based his contention primarily on North Carolina v.
Pearce.3 In Pearce the defendant was convicted for assault with intent to
commit rape. After a retrial, the trial judge ordered a harsher sentence than
had been previously imposed. The United States Supreme Court stated that
vindictiveness toward a defendant for having successfully attacked his first
conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial.
45. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 663 (1973) (companion case)(dissenting opinion, Rehnquist, J.).
46. Neither Chief Justice Burger nor Justice Rehnquist asserted that the state
could show a "compelling" interest.
47. In re Roel, 3 N.Y.2d 224, 144 N.E.2d 24 (1957), appeal denied, 355
U.S. 604 (1958). The New York Court of Appeals held that it was an illegal
practice of law for a Mexican lawyer, unable to become a member of the New
York bar because he was an alien, to advise New York clients on Mexican divorces.
1. 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
2. GA. CoDE ANN. § 26-1902 (1972).
3. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
1974]
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Thus, due process requires that the defendant be free of apprehension of
vindictiveness, since that fear may otherwise deter the exercise of the right
to appeal or to colleratally attack the first conviction. Pearce held that where
a judge imposes a harsher sentence at a second trial for the same offense his
reasons for doing so must "affirmatively appear."4 Chaffin held that Pearce
is not controlling where the jury is uninformed of the prior sentence and the
second sentence is not otherwise shown to be a product of vindictiveness.
Thus, where a fury sentences, the defendant has the burden of showing the
jury's knowledge of the previous conviction and its vindictiveness.
In accordance with the rationale of Pearce, Chaffin had asserted three
due process claims: (1) Harsher sentences on retrial violate the double
jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment;5 (2) harsher sentences occa-
sioned by vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing authority violate
concepts of fairness in the criminal process; 6 and (3) the possibility of a
harsher sentence, even without a reasonable fear of vindictiveness, has an
impermissible "chilling" effect on the exercise of the right to appeal and to
collaterally attack a conviction.
The Court rejected Chaffin's double jeopardy argument, holding that
the original conviction was, by defendant's choice, wholly nullified and the
slate wiped clean.7 Chaffin recognized the power of the state to retry a
4. Id. at 726. Those reasons must be based on objective information con-
cerning the conduct of the defendant occurring after the time of the original
sentence, and such conduct must be readily identifiable. The Court also required
that the factual data on which the increased sentence is based must be made part
of the record so that the constitutional legitimacy of the increased sentence may
be fully reviewed on appeal.
5. Being twice put in jeopardy is a different proposition than being sen-
tenced twice. See Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 784 (1963).
The fifth amendment is applicable to the states through the due process
clause of the 14th amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
6. Pearce found that due process of law required that vindictiveness play
no part in the sentence received after a new trial:
Where, as in each of the cases before us, the original conviction has
been set aside because of a constitutional error, the imposition of such
a punishment, 'penalizing those who choose to exercise' constitutional
rights, 'would be patently unconstitutional.' United States v. Jackson,
890 U.S. 570, 581. And the very threat inherent in the existence of
such a punitive policy wvould, with respect to those still in prison,
serve to 'chill the exercise of basic constitutional rights.' Id. at 582.
See also Griffin v. Calfornia, 880 U.S. 609; c.f. Johnson v. Avery, 893
U.S. 483.... A court is without right to... put a price on an appeal.
A defendant's exercise of a right of appeal must be free and unfettered.[.. ilt is unfair to use the great power pven to the court to determine
sentence to place a defendant in the diemma of making an unfree
choice.' Worcester v. Commissioner, 870 F.2d 713, 718. See Short v.
United States, 120 U.S. App. D.C. 165, 167, 844 F. 2d 550, 552.
395 U.S. at 724. The difference in Pearce and Chaffin is that Pearce requires the
sentencing authority to justify the harsher sentence (show a lack of vindictiveness),
and Chaffin requires the defendant to prove vindictiveness (the sentencing author-
ity is presumed not to have been vindictive).
7. The double jeopardy clause has been held to protect against a second
prosecution for the same offense after the accused is acquitted. Green v. United
States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957); United States v. Ball, 168 U.S. 662 (1896). The
clause has also been construed to prevent a second prosecution for the same
[Vol. 39
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defendant who has succeeded in getting his first conviction set aside, and in
conjunction with such power the right to impose whatever sentence may be
legally authorized. 8
As to Chaffin's second contention, the Court distinguished Pearce by
noting that Chaffin was sentenced by a jury with no knowledge, presumably,
of the first sentence, whereas in Pearce the possibility existed that a judge
with knowledge of the first proceeding might be influenced by that knowl-
edge. The judge's potential inclination to punish the prisoner for appealing,
or his resentment for having to try the suit again, could chill the prisoner's
rights of appeal and due process. Contrarily, a jury has no personal stake
in the matter and no motivation to be vindictive.9
The majority 0 rejected Chaffin's third contention, also, concluding that
harsher second-trial sentences, where free of vindictiveness, are constitu-
tionally valid despite any incidental deterrent effect they may have on the
right to appeal." The court believed that the possibility of a higher sen-
tence is too remote' 2 to produce a "chilling" effect at the time of defendant's
offense after conviction. In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1888). Additionally, the
clause protects against the infliction of multiple punishments for the same
offense. United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 307 (1931); United States v. Sacco,
367 F.2d 868 (2nd Cir. 1966); United States v. Adams, 362 F.2d 210 (6th Cir.
1966); Kennedy v. United States, 880 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1964). In Ashe v.
Swenson, 397 U.S. 486 (1970), the Court indicated that collateral estoppel is a
part of the fifth amendment's guarantee against double jeopardy. In other words,
once a fact or issue has been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue
cannot again be litigated between the same parties in a future lawsuit.
8. The Court relied on reasoning in Pearce. Thus, the state has power "to
retry a defendant who has succeeded in getting his first conviction set aside...
and, as a corollary... to impose whatever sentence may be legally authorized,
whether or not it is greater than the sentence imposed after the first conviction."
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 720. (1969). See Stroud v. United States,
251 U.S. 15 (1919).
9. 412 U.S. at 23. See note 34 infra.
10. Justices Powell, Behnquist, Blackmun, and White, and Chief Justice
Burger.
11. The Supreme Court has never held that the accused has an absolute
right to appeal, but it has held that once such appellate procedures are developed
they must comply with due process requirements. See note 13 infra. Pearce
rejected the argument that since convicts who do not seek new trials cannot have
their sentences increased, it creates an invidious classification, for equal protection
purposes, to impose that risk only on those who succeed in getting their original
conviction set aside. 895 U.S. at 722. Even though a harsher sentence is not a
deliberate effort to frustrate the right of appeal it may be sufficient that it has
that effect if it cannot otherwise be shown as a necessary means for effectuating
a legitimate public policy. This appears to be especially true when considering
the difficulties in applying the Chatfin rule. 412 U.S. at 46 (dissenting opinion).
See text accompanying notes 25-35 infra.
12. 412 U.S. at 83. The court stated:
Several contingencies must coalesce. First, his appeal must succeed.
Second, it must result in an order remanding the case for retrial rather
than dismissing outright. Third, the prosecutor must again make the
decision to prosecute and the accused must again select trial by jury
rather than securing a bench trial or negotiating a plea. Finally, the jury
must again convict and then ultimately the jury or the judge must arrive
1974]
7
et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
decision to appeal. 13
The Chaffin dissent made three telling points. First, there is a sub-
stantial danger of vindictiveness even if the jury is uninformed of the prior
conviction-from the judge, in his handling of the trial and in giving the
instructions, and the prosecutor, in asking for and actively seeking a harsher
sentence. 14 Second, establishing a different rule for judge and jury trials
burdens the defendant's right to trial by jury because a harsher sentence
from a jury is more difficult to attack successfully. 5 Third, the application
of Pearce to jury trials would not be difficult; the judge would be com-
pelled to reduce the second sentence to the level of the first unless he can
set forth the reasons for the harsher sentence as Pearce requires. 6
at a harsher sentence in circumstances devoid of a genuine likelihood of
vindictiveness.... [We cannot agree with petitioner that such specula-
tive prospects interfere with the right to make a free choice whether
to appeal.
13. The American Bar Association recommends that legislatures prohibit a
second harsher sentence for the same offense or a different offense based on the
same conduct. ABA STANARDs RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND
PnOCEDURES § 3.8 (1967). See also, ABA ST ADAS POsT-CoNvICTION REMnEDIES
§ 6.3 (Tent. Draft 1967); ABA STANDARDS APPELLATE REvIEw OF SENTENCES
§ 3.4 (Tent. Draft 1967). The committee thought that the only argument that
can justify an increased sentence is that the original was too light or that new
facts have been discovered that bear upon the sentence. ABA STANDARDS RELATING
TO SENTENCING ALTEBNATIVES AND PnOCEDunEs, § 3.8 (1967). Even this argu-
ment, the committee thought, overlooks the fact that only those who have
exercised their right to appeal are vulnerable to the increased sentence. There is
no rational basis for distinguishing the treatment of those who appeal from those
who do not if both equally deserve, because the first sentence was too light or
because of subsequent events, an increase in sentence. The risk of a greater sen-
tence as the result of the assertion of the right of review necessarily acts, the
committee believed, as a deterrent to the exercise of the right. The committee
concludes that a system which fears the assertion of error to the degree that it
must place artificial deterrents in the path is not conducive to due process. Id.
at 310.
To be constitutionally suspect the hinderance of the right to appeal must
be unreasonable, as the Court states in Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966):
This Court has never held that States are required to establish avenues
of appellate review, but is is now fundamental that, once established,
these avenues must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions that can only
impede open and equal access to the courts.
Id. at 310, citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353; Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477; Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487.
Authorities supporting flexibility in sentencing on retrial rely on four ratio-
nales: (1) A prior sentence has no legal existence because it was imposed
pursuant to a 'void" conviction; (2) by utilizing a post-conviction remedy the
defendant waived any benefit he may have had from a prior sentence; (3) the
appellate court has no authority to revise a sentence imposed by a trial court
within statutory limits (but see, PRoP. NEw Mo. CRIM. CODE § 2.070 (1973),
which permits appellate courts to reduce sentences); and (4) a new trial and
sentence does not foreclose an independent consideration of the sentence at a
second trial, since the new trial and sentence is simply a continuation of the same
case. Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher Penalties and the "Successful" Crim-
inal Appellant, 74 YA.E L.J. 606, 610 (1965).
14. 412 U.S. at 36 (dissenting opinion).
15. Id. at 36.
16. Id. at 37.
[Vol. 39
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Even before Chaffin, federal cases subsequent to Pearce had already
limited its effect. In Moon v. Maryland'7 the Court dismissed, as improvi-
dently granted, a writ of certiorari based on the trial judge's affidavit setting
forth the reasons for the harsher sentence.' 8 These reasons included identi-
fiable conduct of the defendant subsequent to the first sentence. 19 In Colten
v. Kentucky20 the Court refused to apply the Pearce rule to a sentence
received after a trial de novo in a higher court.21 Chaffin, Moon, and Colten
have apparently limited Pearce to cases with judge sentencing where there
is evidence of vindictiveness. 22
The debate, of course, is over the burden of producing evidence.
Pearce requires the judge to set forth identifiable conduct of the defendant
occurring subsequent to the first sentence to justify his harsher sentence
(i.e., show a lack of vindictiveness). 23 hafin presumes that a jury sentence
is not vindictive and requires the defendant to rebut that presumption.24
The practical result is that a judge will impose a harsher sentence less fre-
quently, or, if imposed, a harsher sentence imposed by a judge will stick
much less frequently than one imposed by a jury because the vindictiveness
element will seldom be provable, negatively, or affirmatively.
Excluding Pearce from application where a jury without knowledge of
the prior trial sentences, as the Missouri Supreme Court did in Spidle v.
State,25 raises a problem in the seven states,26 including Missouri, that
17. 898 U.S. 319 (1970).
18. Id. The Court also relied on admission of petitioner's counsel that, "I
have never contended that Judge Pugh was vindictive." Id. at 321.
19. Id. at 820.
20. 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
21. Id. Appellant was charged with disorderly conduct, convicted, and fined
$10 in the Quarterly Court of Fayette County. The appellant had a trial de novo
under Kentucky's two-tier system, but was again convicted and fined $50. The
Court said that there was a fresh determination of guilt and the court had no
motive to deal with a de novo defendant more strictly than any other. Id. at 117.
22. I.e., where the judge does not affirmatively show valid reasons for the
increased sentence.
28. 895 U.S. 711, 725 (1969).
24. 412 U.S. at 28.
25. 446 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. 1969). Defendant was charged with assault with
intent to kill with malice aforethought. The jury at the first trial found him
guilty of assault without malice and fixed punishment at five years imprisonment.
On appeal, the conviction was reversed for the trial courts failure to excuse ajuror for cause. A second trial resulted in the jury finding the defendant guilty
of assault with malice and sentencing him to eight years imprisonment.
See also Kansas City v. Henderson, 468 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1971), where the
Missouri Supreme Court again said, relying on Spidle, that Pearce does not apply
to cases wherein the jury rather than the trial judge determines the punishment.
The court stated that where there is no evidence that the jury knows of a prior
sentence, there can be no violation of due process. See, e.g., McCulley v. State,
486 S.W.2d 419 (Mo. 1972); State v. Holley, 488 S.W.2d 925 (Mo. App.,
D.K.C. 1972).
26. In addition to Missouri, these states include Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky,
Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Virginia.
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normally require jury sentencing.27 By statute in Missouri the jury is to
assess the punishment in situations where there is any alternative or discre-
tion with regard to the kind and extent of punishment.28 Can the defendant,
without restriction, waive his constitutional rights to trial by jury to bring a
possible second trial within Pearce? The Supreme Court of the United States
in Singer v. United States29 said that a defendant can waive the right, but
that the right of so doing may be subjected to the approval of the trial court.
Missouri's rules of criminal procedure provide that all issues of fact in a
criminal case shall be tried by a jury, unless the defendant waives this right
with the assent of the court.2 0 Whether the court's assent must include the
prosecutor's consent has not been determined. In State v. Butler3' a memo-
randum signed by the defendant and his attorney and approved by the trial
judge satisfied the requirements of waiver. That the defendant's right to
elect that he shall be tried by the court without a jury is not absolute is
27. See generally LaFont, Assessment of Punishment-A Judge or Jury Func-
tion? 88 TE Xs L. R v. 835 (1960); Comment, A Review of Sentencing in Mis-
souri: The Need for Re-evaluation and Change, 11 ST. L. U. L. J. 69 (1966);
Comment, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, 53 VA. L. Rxv. 968 (1967).
28. § 546.410, RSMo 1969.
In all cases of a verdict of conviction for any offense where by law there
is any alternative or discretion in regard to the kind or extent of punish-
ment to be inflicted, the jury may assess and declare the punishment in
their verdict, and the court shall render a judgment according to such
verdict, except as herein provided.
There are exceptions to jury sentencing in Missouri. Section 546.430, RSMo 1969,
provides:
The court shall have the power, in all cases of conviction, to reduce the
extent and duration of the punishment assessed by a jury, if in its opinion
the conviction is proper, but the punishment assessed is greater than...
ought to be inflicted.
Section 546.440, RSMo 1969, provides:
Where the jury agree upon a verdict of guilty but fail to agree upon
the punishment to be inflicted or do not declare such punishment by
their verdict, the court shall assess and declare the punishment and
render judgment accordingly. Where the jury find a verdict of guilty and
assess a punishment not authorized by law, and in all cases of judgment
by confession, the court shall assess and declare the punishment, and
render judgment accordingly.
29. 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
30. Mo. R. Cmm. P. 26.01 states:
a.) All issues of fact in any criminal case shall be tried by a jury to be
selected, summoned and returned in the manner prescribed by law,
unless trial by jury be waived as provided in this Rule.
b.) The defendant may, with the assent of the court, waive a trial by jury
and submit the trial of any criminal case to the court, whose findings
shall have the force and effect of the verdict of a jury. In felony cases
such waiver by the defendant shall be made in open court and entered
of record.
See also Mo. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 99 (Nov. 7, 1960):
Defendant in a felony case may, with approval of court, waive his right
to jury trial and be tried without jury according to procedure authorized
by Const. art. 1, section 22(a), and proper method of waiving jury trial
in any criminal case is governed by this rule.
31. 415 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1967).
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shown by State v. Taylor,32 where the trial court's refusal of defendant's
request to waive the jury was approved 3
Should the Pearce rationale-requiring a showing of the reasons for the
harsher sentence-apply where the jury knows of the previous conviction,
either through publicity or improper courtroom comment? As the Chaffin
dissent noted, a judge and/or prosecutor who know can influence the
outcome of a jury trial even if the jury does not know of the previous convic-
tion.3 4 Can the defendant determine on voir dire the extent of the jury's
knowledge without prejudicing his case? If the jury has knowledge of the
prior conviction, will a cautionary instruction be effective? These questions
32. 391 S.W.2d 835 (Mo. 1965). Taylor was convicted of selling a narcotic
drug and sentenced to eight years in prison at the first trial. At a second trial
Taylor was sentenced to 12 years after being denied waiver of a jury. The court
stated:The declared public policy of the state requires that a waiver by an
accused of the right to trial by jury, to be effective, be agreed to by the
court. It is considered the rights of society, as well as the rights and
privileges of the accused, are involved.... The accused has no absolute
right, either by constitution, statute, or court rule, to elect that he shall
be tried by the court without a jury.
Id. at 886. Could the judge at the second trial refuse defendant's request for
waiver solely because he wanted the jury to have the discretion of imposing a
harsher sentence?
88. In Payne v. Nash, 327 F.2d 197 (8th Cir. 1964), the court said:
Appellant's right to trial by jury under the Missouri Constitution (Section
22(a), Art. I, Constitution of Missouri, V.A.M.S.) is the same as the
right that existed at common law. At common law the jury assessed the
guilt or innocence of the accused; the court fixed the punishment. State
v. Morton, 338 S.W.2d 858, 861 (Mo. 1960); State v. Griffin, 839
S.W.2d 803, 806 (Mo. 1960). Though it is permissible for juries to assess
punishment in Missouri (Ex parte Dusenberry, 97 Mo. 504, 11 S.W. 217
(1889)), such was only a conditional privilege. . . . Thus, there is
nothing in the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution, nor in the Constitution and laws of the State
of Missouri, which gave appellant the right to have his punishment
assessed by the jury.
Id. at 200. See State v. Morris, 476 S.W.2d 485 (Mo. 1971); State v. Brown,
448 S.W.2d 805 (Mo. 1969); State v. Hampton, 817 S.W.2d 848 (Mo. 1958).
The question may be asked whether jury sentencing in itself is proper. Some
authorities believe that the jury tends to take into account the punishment when
deciding the question of guilt. Thus, where the issues of guilt and punishment are
decided in the same proceeding, the attorney finds it difficult to persuade thejury to lower the punishment and yet at the same time maintain his client's
innocence. See generally ABA PRoJEcT ON Mnmurm STAiDARDs FOR CmnnAL
JUsTICE SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AN) PRocEmuREs § 1.1 (Approved Draft
1968); PPEsmENrs Comi.~ssioN ON LAw ENFoRc FENTr AND TaE AniuNistm-
TION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF Cnn4 IN A FREE SocIETY 145 (1967);
Stubbs, Jury Sentencing in Georgia-Time for a Change, 5 GA. ST. B.J. 421
(1969); Comment, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, 58 VA. L. lEv. 968 (1967).
Under the PROP. NEw Mo. Cnum. CoDnE § 2.060 (1973), jury sentencing
would be abolished. However, the committee compromised to some extent by pro-
viding that the jury shall be informed of the range of authorized terms which the
court might impose after a jury finding of guilt.
84. 412 U.S. at 86.
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illustrate the difficulty of applying Chaffin. It is submitted that if the jury
knows of the prior conviction the same dangers are present that Pearce
seeks to protect against.35 Further, it will be difficult and hazardous to
determine the extent of the jury's knowledge, and virtually impossible to
prove vindictiveness once discovered.3 6
Ric-ArD J. COLLINS
CRIMINAL LAW-REMARKS BY THE
TRIAL JUDGE TO THE DEFENSE ATTORNEY
State v. Wren'
On August 14, 1970, defendant, Darrell Wren, was arrested for stealing.
At his trial, while his attorney cross-examined a police officer, the trial
judge remarked in the presence of the jury that he would allow the attorney
to develop his line of questioning "ad nauseum."2 Several other times during
the trial the judge admonished the attorney somewhat derogatorily.3 The
defendant was convicted. On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed,
35. Perhaps a jury would be less aware of or less concerned by the added
burden the second trial places on the criminal justice system than a judge. Perhaps
also the jury would be less respectful of the defendants' full exercise of his rights.
The point is that all juries are not likely to react one way and all judges another;
rather, some judges and juries will be vindictive, and some will not.
36. Many courts treat jury deliberations as "privileged." McDonald v. Pless,
238 U.S. 264 (1915).
One partial solution to the problem under discussion is suggested by Phop.
NEw Mo. CmM. CODE § 2.070(2) (1978), which permits an appellate court to
reduce a sentence on the ground that the sentence imposed was more severe than
was appropriate, under the circumstances of the case. Alternatively, the appellate
court may set the sentence aside for further proceedings in the sentencing court.
1. 486 S.W.2d 447 (Mo. 1972).
2. Id. at 448. The comment by the trial judge arose in the following
context:
Defense Counsel: What do you ask them when you stop?
The Court: You will have to develop that it serves some useful purpose.
I can't see any useful purpose in this line of inquiry.
Defense Counsel: Your Honor, it will become relevant because the
defendant was afraid.
Prosecutor: I object to the question on the grounds of immateriality,
Your Honor.
The Court: I think the objection is well justified, but I will overrule you
and allow you to develop this ad nauseum. Go ahead and proceed. Ask
your questions.
3. Brief for Appellant at 39, State v. Wren, 486 S.W.2d 447 (Mo. 1972).
During the defense attorney's cross-examination, the trial judge interrupted the
defense counsel with the following comment:
That has been asked at least three or four times. I ask you not to
plow the field again and again, Mr. (defense counsel). I have heard
you ask that, and I have heard opposing counsel ask it, and I just don't
want to hear it again. Just because you don't like the answer, you are
not entitled to ask the question again or if you do like the answer, you
don't ask it again.
[Vol. 39
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [1974], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss2/7
RECENT CASES
stating that "an undue burden was placed on defendant and that he was
denied a fair trial."4 The court reasoned that the words "ad nauseum" could
have conveyed to the jury the impression that the trial court thought defen-
dant's evidence to be without merit and "totally absurd."5 This reasoning is
apparently based on the assumption that jurors identify the defendant with
his attorney, and hence derogatory remarks by the trial judge to the attor-
ney may prejudice the clients case.6
The foundation of the American system of criminal law is that every
defendant has a constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial.7 A corner-
stone of the foundation rests upon the rule that "a fair trial exacts absolute
impartiality on the part of the judge, as to both his conduct and remarks."8
Missouri has codified rules pertaining to judicial conduct in the Canons of
Judicial Ethics9 that require a trial judge to conduct himself without bias.
The problem is distinguishing remarks directed to the defense attorney
which may prejudice a criminal defendant from fair, though possibly stern,
remarks which trial judges necessarily use occasionally to maintain an
orderly trial. Criticism or admonishment of an attorney, whether in cham-
bers'0 or in the presence of the jury, rests within the discretion of the trial
court and ordinarily will not be grounds for reversal." This general rule
"establish[es] that one person, the judge, must be in charge of the court-
room to assure an orderly trial."f 2 The cases show that when appellate
4. 486 S.W.2d at 449.
5. Id.
6. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50
TExAs L. Rlv. 629, 655 (1972).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Mo. CoNsT. art. 1, § 18(a).
8. State v. Hudson, 858 Mo. 424, 425, 215 S.W.2d 441, 442 (Mo. 1948).
See also State v. Tate, 468 S.W.2d 646 (Mo. 1971); State v. Sanders, 860
S.W.2d 722, 726 (Mo. 1962); State v. Pinkston, 883 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960).
9. ABA CANONS oF JuDicrxLr ETmcs (1967) provide:
2.05 Essential Conduct-A judge should be temperate, attentive,
patient, impartial, and, since he is to administer the law and apply it
to the facts, he should be studious of the principles of the law and
diligent in endeavoring to ascertain the facts.
2.10 Courtesy and Civility-A judge should be courteous to counsel,
especially to those who are young and inexperienced, and also to all
others appearing or concerned in the administration of justice in the
courts.
2.15 Interference in Conduct of Trial-Conversation between the judge
and counsel in court is often necessary, but the judge should be studious
to avoid controversies which are apt to obscure the merits of the dispute
between litigants and lead to its unjust disposition. In addressing coun-
sel, litigants, or witnesses, he should avoid a controversial manner
or tone.
10. See United States v. Capaldo, 402 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968); Harris v.
United States, 867 F.2d 683 (1st Cir. 1966); Paddock v. United States, 820 F.2d
624 (9th Cir. 1963); Green v. State, 42 Ala. App. 489, 167 So. 2d 694 (1964);
State v. Mucie, 448 S.W.2d 879 (Mo. 1970).
11. State v. Barron, 465 S.W.2d 523 (Mo. 1971); State v. Gyngard, 883
S.W.2d 78 (Mo. 1960); State v. Thursby, 245 S.W.2d 859, 863 (Mo. 1952)(defense attorney's statement was "childish"); State v. Teeter, 239 Mo. 475, 488,
144 S.W. 445, 447 (1912) (defense attorneys "only competent to practice beforejustices of the peace").
12. 486 S.W.2d at 448.
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courts characterize the trial judge's remarks as criticism or discipline of an
attorney, relief will not be granted.'3 The defendant must show more than a
chastizing of his attorney, but prejudice to his interests. 4
If a defense attorney believes the judge's remarks exhibit bias, the
attorney must object or move for a mistrial to preserve the error for review.'5
Even with a proper objection, however, appellate review may be handi-
capped. A transcript cannot convey tonal quality and facial expressions
which may cloak innocuous words with prejudice. In State v. Barnholtz,16
the Missouri Supreme Court recognized that "Until . . . transcripts are
brought to us on sound recordings there is little that we can do about
objections to tonal qualities."17
The reviewing courts must examine the record as a whole to decide the
actual effect of the allegedly prejudicial remarks. Separate passages,
isolated from the entire trial record, will often take on an undeserved aura
of special importance. The appellate court must place itself in the position
of the jury to determine whether the remarks were prejudicial.' 8
18. Cases cited note 11 supra.
14. Cases cited note 11 supra.
15. See Trial Tactics in Criminal Cases, 37 TENN. L. REV. 705 (1970)
(proceedings of a symposium at the Southeastern Trial Lawyers Institute), where
Mr. Rothblatt described how he handles a trial judge whose conduct seemed
biased against him:
The question is how to take him on. Very early in the trial, when he
begins to show his prejudice, let him know in a dignified way that you
are not afraid of him. What I do is immediately call a bench conference.
A case I was trying about two months ago was presided over by a judge
who did not really mean to act in an apparently prejudiced manner. I
think it was just one of those unfortunate slips. He made some remark
.. that I thought was a little facetious and sarcastic, causing members
of the jury to snicker. I immediately said to myself, "Let me put him in
his place." Aloud, I said, "Your Honor, we want a bench conference."
We went up to the bench and, almost in a monotone, I said, "The defen-
dant now moves for a mistrial." (When you tell off a judge, you, the
attorney, never make any motions; it is the defendant who is making the
motions . . . . ) I said, "Your Honor's remarks, though I'm sure they
weren't deliberate, hurt just as badly when you said
and I quoted his exact words. I said, "There was snickering *n the jury.
Your Honor gave that jury the impression that the defendants defense
here is completely without merit."...
Every time you chew out a judge.., raise constitutional questions.
What you are doing is telling the judge in very nice language that you
are a constitutional lawyer, that you are telling him off in constitutional
terms, that this case is going not only all the way to the highest state
court, but that you are going to petition for certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court, and that the petition is going to say what a lousy
mean judge he is.
Id. at 714. See State v. Hudson, 358 Mo. 424, 215 S.W.2d 441 (1948).
16. 287 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. 1956).
17. Id. at 812. Accord, Goldstein v. United States, 63 F.2d 609 (8th Cir.
1933), where the district court stated: "It is impossible to gather from the cold
record, particularly when it is in narrative form, the atmosphere of the trial itself,
the manner in which the words were spoken . . . ." Id. at 613. See also State v.
Hudson, 858 Mo. 424, 428, 215 S.W.2d 441, 443 (1948).
18. In United States v. Porter, 441 F.2d 1204 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 911 (1971), the court stated: "It is difficult for appellate judges to place
[Vol. 39
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Two analyses have developed to make this determination. It is some-
times stated that courts will reverse only when the remark appears likely to
have contributed to the defendant's conviction.19 In United States v. Porter,20
the defense attorney was admonished for delaying the trial and at one point
a heated exchange took place between him and the trial judge.21 The court
applied the test "that error is not harmless if there is a reasonable possibility
that the matter complained of might have contributed to the conviction."22
The court acknowledged that the remarks were outside "the confines of
judicial propriety,"23 but affirmed the conviction because they had not
affected the outcome.24 In State v. Hicks25 the Missouri Supreme Court
applied a test similar to that used in Porter and found that three separate
statements26 to defense counsel by the trial court indicated obvious hostility
and "could not help but [have] obscure[d] the merits of the litigation and
which may have contributed to an unjust result."27 Accordingly, defendant's
conviction of second degree murder was reversed.2 8
themselves in the subjective role of a juror to assess the prejudicial effect of
erroneous comment." Id. at 1215.
19. See Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1968); Homan v. United
States, 279 F.2d 767, 771 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 866 (1960).
20. 441 F.2d 1204 (8th Cir. 1971).
21. Id. at 1218-14 n.4. The following colloquy took place. Mr. Steinger
(attorney for Porter):
Yes, let the record show that the United States District Attorney has
supplied me the written statement. If it please your Honor, I would like
to ask for a ten-minute recess for the reason there are some changes that
have been made as evidenced by the first page, and I would like to
compare it to all the pages because that change is not indicated on
page 1.
To this the court replied:
Let's don't make a speech about that. I would say to you without the
slightest fear of any contradiction if there's a difference in them, there s
some misunderstanding somewhere about it, because I know the govern-
ment is not in the habit of giving information to people that is untrue
and incorrect. I don't think you ought to be making that statement unless
you can back it up.
Id. On one occasion defense counsel was also admonished for "deliberate tactics"
and on another for "blowing smoke rings" to "confuse the jury." Id.
22. Id. at 1215.
23. Id. at 1213.
24. The court noted that "the erroneous comments occupy only brief moments
in the overall proceedings .... Based on our reading of the entire record here,
we must conclude that the jury was not influenced by the comments of the
court .. " Id. at 1215-16.
25. 488 S.W.2d 215 (Mo. 1969).
26. During the cross-examination of a police officer, the officer asked the
defense attorney what he meant by the word "awesome," and the trial judge
remarked to the defense attorney, "The officer asked you a pretty good question."
Id. at 220. Later, while the defense counsel was examining a witness the trialjudge on his own accord remarked, "What is the purpose ofthis? We are going
on a Cooks tour." Id. Finally, the defense attorney asked for a few moments to
examine some records, and the trial judge remarked, "All right, gentlemen. Let's
step on it." Id. at 220-21.
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A second test is one of substantial injustice. If the evidence, in light of
the whole record, is so overwhelmingly against the defendant that he would
have been convicted in any event, the conviction will stand.29 In State v.
Bunton" the Missouri Supreme Court seemed to challenge this view. There,
the trial judge had interrupted the trial and threatened the defense attorney
with contempt on several occasions. The supreme court reversed the ulti-
mate trial court conviction on a finding that, by reason of his remarks, the
trial judge had conveyed to the jury the impression that the defense lacked
merit and had therefore contributed to the conviction.3' Regarding the
strength of the evidence the court said:
It may be that he would be convicted by any jury in a trial where
the fairness and impartiality of the trial fudge could not be ques-
tioned. But that is not the criterion. Guilty or innocent, the defen-
dant was entitled to be tried fairly and impartially.32
Bunton is more in line with traditional notions of fair play; the strength
of the evidence should have no bearing on whether a defendant was prej-
udiced by a trial judge's remark.
Relief will seldom be granted if defense counsel provoked the trial
judge's comment.3 Thus, the defendant must sometimes suffer the con-
sequences of his counsel's misconduct. The rationale for this rule is discour-
aging defense attorneys from deliberately provoking remarks from the trial
judge and then urging such remarks as error on appeal.
Appellate courts are favorably impressed by attempts at amelioration.
Courts in a majority of jurisdictions, including Missouri, generally affirm
convictions where the trial court, although making harsh comments to
29. Homan v. United States, 279 F.2d 767 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 866 (1960), in which the court stated:
Errors of the trial court which may be prejudicial in a close criminal
case, in the sense of being capable in such a situation of possibly affect-
ing the result, can well be without any such rational possibility in a
strong case, and thus not entitle the defendant to a reversal of his
conviction.
Id. at 771. See United States v. Hamilton, 452 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 925 (1972); United States v. Coke, 339 F.2d 183 (2d Cir.
1964); People v. Johnson, 219 Cal. 72, 25 P.2d 408 (1933); State v. Gionfriddo,
154 Conn. 90, 221 A.2d 851 (1966); Tyndall v. State, 234 So.2d 154 (Fla. App.
1970); People v. Evenow, 355 Ill. 451, 189 N.E. 368 (1934); State v. Mont-
gomery, 223 S.W.2d 463 (Mo. 1949); State v. Musick, 101 Mo. 260, 14 S.W.
212 (1890); Dale v. State, 441 P.2d 476 (Okla. Crim. App. 1968).
30. 312 Mo. 655, 280 S.W. 1040 (1926).
31. Id. at 365, 280 S.W. at 1043.
32. Id. at 666, 280 S.W. at 1043.
33. See Carter v. United States, 373 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1967); People v.
Dickenson, 210 Cal. App. 2d 127, 26 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1962); People v. Allum,
78 Ill. App. 2d 462, 223 N.E.2d 187 (1967); Commonwealth v. Haley, 296
N.E.2d 207 (Mass. 1973); Lambert v. State, 471 P.2d 935 (Okla. Crim. App.
1970); Fleck v. State, 380 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Crim. 1964); State v. Hankish,
147 W. Va. 123, 126 S.E.2d 42 (1962).
In State v. Headley, 18 S.W.2d 37 (Mo. 1929), the court thought defense
counsel was trying to lead the court into error. The Court: "I cannot think you are
making it in good faith. While you have a right to make your objections, there
ought at least to be some foundation for them." Id. at 40.
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defense counsel, subsequently instructed the jurors to ignore the comments
in arriving at their verdict.34 This cautionary instruction is often seized on
as an independent rationale to support the conviction 3 5 The actual effect of
such warnings on the jurors is impossible to measure. In Mansfield v. United
States,3 6 a mail fraud prosecution, the trial judge remarked at one point,
"This lawsuit is turning into a riot .... This is the most outrageous case I
have ever tried . . . ."37 At the end of the colloquy and again before sub-
mission the trial judge told the jury to disregard all controversies that took
place between the trial judge and defense attorneys. The convictions were
affirmed because the "admonitions of the court must have had the effect of
dispelling any possible harmful effect the remarks may have had"3 8 It is
submitted that in an area so potentially destructive of the defendant's
interest an assumption that a cautionary instruction will cure a prejudicial
remark is unjustified.
The most satisfactory way to eliminate the instant problem is for trialjudges to refrain from making pejorative remarks to defense counsel. This
is far from an easy solution, as the majority of such remarks occur during
an emotion-filled trial in which a person's liberty is at stake. To prevent
error, the trial judge should make every effort to make all critical remarks
to the defense attorney in a bench conference or in chambers. If a heated
remark should slip out, the trial judge should admonish the jury in a
serious tone that whatever remarks he has made to the defense attorney
should not and must not be considered in their deliberations.
Though some defense lawyers may agree with the writer who viewedjudges as tyrants,3 9 it is important to remember that the handing out ofjustice "is the highest function the state performs to its subjects, and it
requires and demands wisdom, justice, and moderation to a high degree in
both court and counsel."40 Because the problem of prejudicial remarks has
84. State v. Hudson, 358 Mo. 424, 426, 215 S.W.2d 441, 442 (1948);State v. Strait, 279 S.W. 109, 114 (Mo. 1925); cases cited note 35 infra.35. See United States v. Boatner, 478 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1973); UnitedStates v. Carrion, 463 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. King, 415 F.2d737 (6th Cir. 1969); Duran v. United States, 413 F.2d 596 (9th Cir. 1969);Carter v. United States, 373 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1967); Milam v. United States,322 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1963); People v. Dickenson, 210 Cal. App. 2d 127, 26
Cal. Rptr. 601 (1962); Hughes v. State, 103 So. 2d 207 (Fla. App. 1958);Commonwealth v. Haley, 296 N.E.2d 207 (Mass. 1973); Riley v. State, 406S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Crim. 1966); State v. Ingle, 64 Wash. 2d 491, 392 P.2d442 (1964).36. 76 F.2d 224 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 601 (1935).
37. Id. at 232.
38. Id.39. Schwartz, Judges as Tyrants, 7 Cnmv. L. BULL. 129, (1971):Glaring down from their elevated perches, insulting, abrupt, rude, sar-
castic, atronizing, intimidating, vindictive, insisting on not merely
respect tut also abject servility-such judges are frequently encounteredin American trial courts, particularly the lowest criminal and juvenile
courts which account for most of our criminal business.
Id. at 130.
40. State v. Whitworth, 126 Mo. 573, 582, 29 S.W. 575, 597 (1895).
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not reached serious proportions, it seems that it can be controlled by an
occasional reversal. A measure of respect is due to trial judges, for in the
vast number of cases they handle, such remarks are the exception rather
than the rule.4
NILES S. CORSON
ESTATE TAX-TAXATION OF LIFE INSURANCE HELD BY THE
INSURED AS TRUSTEE: THE OTHER VIEW OF SKIFTER
Skifter v. Commissioner'
More than three years prior to his death, Hector Skifter assigned his
entire interest in nine insurance policies on his life to his wife. When the
wife died in 1961 the policies passed through her estate into a testamentary
trust. Her daughter was the sole income beneficiary of the trust, which gave
the daughter power to appoint the remainder by will.2 Skifter was both
executor and trustee.3 As trustee, he was empowered to terminate the trust
by paying the corpus to the income beneficiary.4 When Skifter died in 1964
the proceeds of the policies were not included in the gross estate on his
federal estate tax return. The Commissioner asserted a deficiency,5 claiming
that Skifter's powers as trustee constituted sufficient incidents of ownership
41. See generally Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 166 (1958).
1. 468 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1972).
2. In default of appointment the principal was to pass to the daughter's
livin issue or, if there were none, to the insured if he were still living, and if not,
to other named beneficiaries. Id. at 1092.
3. As executor, Skifter filed a New York estate tax return in which the
gross estate included the nine insurance policies on his life valued at $20,620.32.
Aside from receipt of the policies, Skifters only act as trustee was to receive
dividends on one of them. He made no distribution of income or principal. Estate
of Hector R. Skifter, 56 T.C. 1190, 1192-93 (1971).
4. The will provided:
TmusE: A. I authorize my Trustee in his absolute discretion, at any
time and from time to time, to pay over the whole or any part of the
principal of the trust created by ARTICLE TWO of this Will to any
beneficiary entitled at the time of such payment to the current income
from the principal so paid over whether or not any such payment shall
result in the termination of the trust from which the payment is made.
56 T.C. at 1192.
5. The deficiency was computed on the basis of proceeds of $121,923.52
from the nine insurance policies. With respect to one of these policies, Skifter
paid an annual premium until his death. REv. RuL. 71-497, 1971-2 Cum. BULL.
329, suggests that this fact brings a portion of the premiums paid within the
reach of § 2035 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 [hereinafter the Code]
transactions in contemplation of death). See Gorman v. U.S., 288 F. Supp. 225
E.D. Mich. 1968); Estate of Coleman, 52 T.C. 921 (1969). Compare Bel v. U.S.,
452 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1971), noted in Federal Estate Tax-Life Insurance-
Policy Transferred and Premiums Paid In Contemplation of Death, 38 Mo. L.
[Vol. 39
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to require inclusion of the proceeds of his gross estate under section 2042(2)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.6 The court held that the proceeds
were not includible in the gross estate.7
A significant aspect of the court's holding restricts section 2042 to
incidents of ownership exercisable by decedent for his own or his estate's
benefit. A Treasury Regulation under section 2042 stated that a decedent
who had, as trustee, the power to change the beneficial ownership of the
policy or its proceeds, or the time or manner of enjoyment, had incidents of
ownership in the policy even though he had no beneficial interest therein."
REV. 710 (1973), with First National Bank v. U.S., 423 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir.
1970). See generally Eliasberg, Contemplation of Death and the Estate Taxation
of Life Insurance, 111 TR. & EsT. 690 (1972). The premiums on another policy
were paid by Skifter's employer. REV. RuL. 68-884, 1968-1 Cum. BULL. 403,
restated and superseded in REv. RuL. 69-54, 1969-1 Cum. BuLL. 221, outlines
the circumstances under which group life insurance may be assigned. In New
York such transfers were upheld in Lansdorf v. U.S., 408 F.2d 461 (Ct. C1.
1969). For a recent case applying § 2042 of the Code to group term life insurance
see In re Estate of Lumpkin, 474 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1973). See generally
Eliasberg, Life Insurance: Recent Estate Tax Developments, 1970 INs. L.J. 884,
339-42; Dopheide, Assigning Group Life Insurance: How Can the Current Prob-
lems Be Overcome, 84 J. TAx 220 (Ap. 1971).
6. Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, as amended. Section 2042 provides in part:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property...
(2) RECEIVABLE BY OTHER BENEFiciws.-To the extent of the amount
receivable by other beneficiaries as insurance under policies on the life
of the decedent with respect to which the decedent possessed at his
death any of the incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in
conjunction with any other person.
7. 468 F.2d 699, 705 (2d Cir. 1972). Decisions concerning insurance held
by the insured as trustee have been inconsistent. See generally Note, Federal
Estate Taxation-Life Insurance Trusts, 49 N.C.L. REv. 589 (1971); Note,
Cotrusteeship Sufficient Incidents of Ownership to Require Inclusion of Corpus
in Cotrustee's Gross Estate Where Possibility of Economic Benefit Exists, 22
VAND. L. REv. 711 (1969).
8. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (4) f1958) provides:
A decedent is considered to have 'incidents of ownership" in an insur-
ance policy on his life held in trust if, under the terms of the policy,
the decedent (either alone or in conjunction with another person or
persons) has the power (as trustee or otherwise) to change the bene-
ficial ownership in the policy or its proceeds, or the time and manner of
enjoyment thereof, even though the decedent has no beneficial interest
in the trust ....
(emphasis added). Compare Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (2) 1958):
For purposes of this paragraph, the term "incidents of ownership"
is not limited in its meaning to ownership of the policy in the technical
legal sense. Generally speaking, the term has reference to the right of
the insured or his estate to the economic benefits of the policy. Thus,
it includes the power to change the beneficiary, to surrender or cancel
the policy, to assign the policy, to revoke an assignment, to pledge the
policy for a loan, or to obtain from the insurer a loan against the
surrender value of the policy, etc....
(emphasis added). That the incidents of ownership under § 2042 are based on
the right of the insured or his estate to the economic benefits of the policy is
shown by H.R. Rep. No. 2833, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 163 (1942); S. Rep. No.
1681, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 235 (1942). The phrase "economic benefits" appears
1974]
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The Commissioner argued that Skifter's power to terminate the trust and
pay the corpus to the income beneficiary was clearly in contravention of this
regulation.9 The court, however, like the Tax Court before it,10 refused to
interpret this regulation to apply where the exercise of the power could not
benefit the decedent or his estate, thus implying that the regulation went too
far."1 Prior cases seemingly supported the Commissioner's position.12
The Skifter court grounded its reasoning on what it saw to be the
purpose of section 2042-to extend to life insurance estate tax treatment
roughly equal to that given other forms of property.13 The court logically
points out that the Skifter trust included property other than life insurance,
but that no contention was made that Skifter's power over this property
should cause its inclusion in the gross estate.14 Section 2036 would be
inapplicable to such property because it applies only when the decedent
to have originated in Chase National Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327 (1929).
See Estate of Burt L. Fuchs, 47 T.C. 199, 206 (1966), and Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 40 B.T.A. 268, 272 (1939), where the courts decisions were
premised on the assumption that the term "incidents of ownership" presupposes
that the insured or his estate can obtain some economic benefit from the policy.
But see In re Estate of Lumpkin, 474 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., 355 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1966). Compare Estate
of Harry R. Fruehauf, 50 T.C. 915, 918-19 (1968), with Freuhauf v. Commis-
sioner, 427 F.2d 80, 86 (6th Cir. 1970).
9, 468 F.2d 699, 703 (2d Cir. 1972).
10. Estate of Hector R. Skifter, 56 T.C. 1190, 1197 (1971).
11. 468 F.2d at 703. If a regulation, as a formal explanation of the statute,
exceeds the scope of a statute it is invalid. See, e.g., Manhattan General Equip-
ment Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129 (1936).
12. In Commissioner v. Karagheusian's Estate, 233 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1956),
decedent's wife purchased insurance on his life and placed it in trust. The trust
instrument provided that the wife could alter, amend, or revoke the trust only
with the consent of both the insured and their daughter. The court of appeals
held that "if the decedent acting with others can effectively change the bene-
ficiary of the policy, he possesses an incident of ownership." Id. at 199. In contrast
to Skifter, in Karagheusian's Estate the decedent's power could be exercised for
his own benefit, and extended to the selection of new, additional, or alternate
beneficiaries. 233 F.2d at 198. Skifter could not change who enjoyed the property,
but only when the beneficiary enjoyed it. The Skifter court thought the decedent's
power in Karagheusianfs Estate was analogous to a general power of appointment.
Section 2041 makes includible in the gross estate property over which the
decedent possessed a general power of appointment. Section 2041 defines a
general power of appointment as a power which is exercisable in favor of the
decedent, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate. § 2041(b) (1). A
power of appointment is not a general power, and therefore is not taxable under
§ 2041, if it is exercisable only in favor of one or more designated persons other
than the decedent or his estate. Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(c) (1) (1958). Section
2041 would not apply to Karagheusians Estate because there the insured's power
could be exercised only in conjunction with the creator of the power. See §2041(b) (1) (C) (i).
In accord with Karagheusian's Estate are Goldstein v. United States, 122
F. Supp. 677 (Ct. Cl. 1954); Hall v. Wheeler, 174 F. Supp. 418 (D. Me. 1959);
Altsbuler v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Mo. 1958).
13. See S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1954). The legislative
history of § 2042 is in 2 J. MEnTENS, THE LAw OF FEDER.AL GIFT AND ESTATE
TAXATION § 17 (1959).
14. 468 F.2d at 703.
[Vol. 39
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retained the prohibited power in a prior transfer.15 Section 2038 gave the
court more difficulty because Skifter did have the power to terminate the
trust at his death,16 and under that section it is immaterial whether the
power can be exercised for decedent's benefit.17 Arguing by analogy, the
Commissioner contended that this power, applicable to other property
through section 2039, should be considered an incident of ownership and
hence applicable to life insurance through section 2042.18
In rejecting this analogy the court noted that section 2038 had never
been applied where decedent's power to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate
had been conferred on him by another.19 Skifter did not reserve his power
15. Id. For purposes of inclusion under § 2036 the decedent must retain
for life the right to income from property he transfers or the right to designate
the persons who shall possess or enjoy the income.
For purposes of inclusion under § 2037 the decedent must retain a reversion-
ary interest in the property transferred. The five percent reversionary rule of§ 2087 applies to life insurance under § 2042. S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 124 (1954).
16. By terminating the trust and paying the corpus to the income beneficiary.§ 2038(a) (1) provides:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property ...
It] o the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any
time made a transfer .. . where the enjoyment thereof was subject at
the date of his death to any change through the exercise of a power(in whatever capacity exercisable) by the decedent alone or by the
decedent in conjunction with any other person (without regard to when
or from what source the decedent acquired such power) to alter, amend,
revoke, or terminate, or where any such power is relinquished in con-
templation of decedent's death.
Skifter's power was within § 2038. In Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335(1953), the decedent transferred property to a trust for the benefit of his children,
but retained as trustee the power to accumulate the income and distribute the
corpus. The court held the property subject to taxation under the predecessor to§ 2038. See also Commissioner v. Holmes, 326 U.S. 480 (1946); Estate of
Thorp v. Commissioner, 164 F.2d 966 (3d Cir. 1947). See generally 3 MERTENS,
supra note 13, § 25.08.
17. Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953); Commissioner v. Holmes,
326 U.S. 480 (1946); Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U.S. 486 (1933); Reinecke v.
Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929); Florida National Bank v. United States,
336 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1964); Commissioner v. Chase National Bank, 82 F.2d
157 (2d Cir. 1986).
18. 468 F.2d at 703. Apparently, the Commissioner failed to argue § 2038
as an independent grounds for inclusion in the the Tax Court, and thus could
not do so in the court of appeals. Issues before the Tax Court are framed by the
pleadings, as in any other court, and the appellate court will not review issues
not properly raised there. This is especially true where a new theory of liability
in support of the Commissioner's position involves a completely different section
of the Code and may be affected by additional facts not in the record. See 9 J.
MERTENS, Thm LAw OF FEDERAL INco~m TAxATioN § 51.26 (Rev. ed. 1971).
The Revenue Act of 1969 made the Tax Court a constitutional court.
Although the Commissioner can appeal its ruling, the Tax Court is bound in
later cases only by appellate court decisions involving cases in the particular
circuit. See Jack E. Golsen, 54 T.C. 742 (1970).
19. Id. at 703-04. Section 2038 has been applied, however, to powers created
in the decedent by law, as, for example, where under state law a gift from one
spouse to another remains revocable by the donor. Vaccaro v. United States,
149 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1945); Commissioner v. Allen, 108 F.2d 961 (3d Cir.
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when he transferred the policies; it developed on him long after the transfer.
The transaction was thus nontestamentary and not one the estate tax
provisions were aimed toward.20 Because no case had specifically held that
section 2038 extends to powers the decedent receives from another, the
court believed that including the policies with regard to the source of the
power, under section 2042, would discriminate against life insurance as a
form of property.21
The court's view of the reach of section 2038 disregards its plain
wording. Section 2038 expressly provides that it is applicable without regard
to when or from what source the decedent acquired his power.22 The court
finessed this language by finding that it went no farther than to require
inclusion of property over which decedents power, although received by him
subsequent to his initial transfer, was created by him in someone else (his
transferor) at the time of the initial transfer.23 This situation is more clearly
1939). It has also been applied to hold that contributions by the decedent to a
trust created by his wife are includible where his consent is required to revoke
or modify the trust, REv. RUL. 55-683, 1955-2 Cum. BUL.. 603. In several states
voluntary trusts are revocable by the settlor, unless expressly made irrevocable by
the trust instrument. See Note, 55 HA~v. L. BEv. 684 (1942). Apart from state
law, the grantor may have the power to revoke because of his incapacity, the
beneficiary's fraud, etc. See 4 H. ScoTt, THE LAw oF TnusTs §§ 329A, 333 (3d
ed. 1967). For a discussion of the significance of state law see 3 MERTENS, supra
note 13, § 25.05.
20. The critical test under § 2038 is whether enjoyment was subject, at the
date of death, to any change of enjoyment through the exercise of a power to
revoke. Where the donors consent is a necessary element of revocation (either
because expressly required by the instrument of transfer or under state law) the
transfer would seem to be sufficiently testamentary to be includible. Yet, the
Skirter transaction may not have been because it is not one that would be planned
when testamentary decisions are made, largely because it is triggered by the
fortuitous order of death of Skifter and his wife, and also because the policies did
not avoid the estate tax completely-Mrs. Skifters estate had paid tax on them.
56 T.C. at 1192.
21. Dictum in Fruehauf v. Commissioner, 427 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1970),
supports the proposition that the power must have been one that is retained by
the decedent. In Fruehauf decedents wife purchased a policy insuring his life
which passed at her death into a testamentary trust. The insured was both trustee
and income beneficiary. As trustee, he had power to surrender the policies for
cash value, thus increasing the income producing capacity of the trust to his
own advantage. In holding that the insured possessed incidents of ownership, the
court specifically distinguished the situation in which the insured holds the
requisite powers over the policies solely as "a transferee, in a fiduciary capacity,
of those powers, with no beneficial interest therein." 427 F.2d at 84. This dictum
finds support in Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U.S. 436 (1933), and Commissioner
v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 82 F.2d 157 (1936), cases interpreting the predecessor to
§ 2038. See also St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. United States, 262 F.Supp. 27
(E.D. Mo. 1966); Estate of Myron Selznick, 15 T.C. 716 (1950). But see Kearns
v. United States, 399 F. Supp. 226 (Ct. Cl. 1968); United States v. Rhode Island
Hospital Trust Co., 355 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1966).
22. See statute quoted note 16 supra; 3 MERT.ENS, supra note 13, § 25.03.
23, 468 F.2d at 704. The court concluded that the langage "without regard
to when or from what source the decedent acquired suchpower," in § 2038,
added by Congress in 1936, was a response to White v. Poor, 296 U.S. 98 (1935),
and had since been applied strictly to change the result in that case. In White v.
Poor the decedent created an inter vivos trust and conferred on the trustee the
(Vol. 39
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testamentary than than in Skifter.24
Skifter, although no Polaris of statutory interpretation, arguably fulfills
the legislative purpose manifested by the federal estate tax scheme-to tax
every transaction that is the substantial equivalent of a testamentary disposi-
tion.25 Congress listed several powers that it considered to be incidents of
ownership within the ambit of the new section 2042.26 These powers all
involve a substantial degree of control over the policy.2 7 Such control would
allow a decedent to determine the passing of the property until the time of
his death, and thus is testamentary.28 But Shifter had no intention of retain-
ing the incidents of ownership in the policies and had irrevocably transferred
all interests in them to his wife. The powers he received as trustee were not
exercisable for his or a third party's benefit. In In re Estate of Lumpkin29
the decedent, under the provisions of a group term policy on his life, had
the power to alter the time and manner of enjoyment of the proceeds but
not, as in Skifter, to select any new, additional, or alternative beneficiaries.30
The court held this control was substantial enough to require inclusion, but
noted that the insured could easily have divested himself of control com-
pletely by assigning the power.3 1 This is precisely what Skifter did orig-
power jointly to terminate the trust. Decedent was subsequently appointed as
successor trustee, and as such at death possessed that power. The Supreme Court
held that the predecessor to § 2088 did not apply because decedent had not
retained the power at the time of the transfer but had received it later. He had,
of course, created the power in someone else to make him a successor trustee at
the time of the initial transfer.
24. It is more clearly testamentary because it can be planned by decedent
as part of his overall testamentary dispositions, unlike the Skifter transaction.
See note 20 supra.
25. C. LowNDs & R. KRwm, FnmntnAx EsTArn & Gi=T TAXES § 2.2 (2d
ed. 1962).
26. H.R. Rep. No. 2388, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 168 (1942); S. Rep. No. 1631,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 285 (1942). The treasury must have relied on this legislative
history in promulgating Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (2) (see note 8 supra)
because the list contained therein is virtually identical to the one set forth in the
committee reports.
27. See In re Estate of Lumpkin, 474 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 355 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1966), for an
indication that "substantial control" is the test of incidents of ownership.
28. Compare In re Estate of Lumpkin, 474 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1978),
with National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 87 F. Supp. 773 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
29. 474 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1978).
30. The insurance contract contained an "Optional Modes of Settlement"
provision exercisable in connection with the "Contingent Coverage" benefits
which empowered the insured to elect to have any monthly installments payable
to his spouse reduced by half. But in any event, the order in which the insured's
survivors succeeded to the right to receive the proceeds was irrevocably fixed.
474 F.2d at 1093.
31. 474 F.2d at 1097-98. One of the insurance policies with which the
Skifter case was concerned was a group term policy. Assuming that the policy in
Lumpkin could have been assigned as the court suggests, if it later came under
the control of the insured as trustee coincident with a power to .terminate the
trust for the benefit of someone other than the insured, it would still have been
includible in the insured's gross estate if Skifter were not followed.
23
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inally. To require inclusion in spite of this would arguably defeat the
intention of Congress. In this respect, the Tax Court's conclusion in Skifter
is significant:
(I)t seems inconceivable ... that Congress would have intended
the proceeds to be included in the insured's gross estate ... merely
because the third-party owner of the policy had entrusted the
insured with fiduciary powers that were exercisable only for the
benefit of persons other than the insured.32
Although life insurance is inherently testamentary,33 its transfer is not
necessarily a testamentary substitute. 4 Skifter is arguably a case in which it
was not.35 If so, the court's disregard of the plain wording of sections 2042
and 2038 and their accompanying regulations, in favor of fulfilling the legis-
lative intent, may be justified.
RICHMD M. WAUCH
EVIDENCE-SILENCE AS AN ADMISSION OF GUILT
-ADMISSIBILITY CRITICIZED.
State v. Hornbeck'
On the evening of August 20, 1969, the defendant was arrested for
burglary. Two police officers, acting on the report of an informer, had placed
a suspicious automobile under surveillance for several hours. The automobile
was parked in a residential area where numerous burglaries had been
reported during the preceding three months. The police officers disconnected
wires in the engine of the automobile so the driver would be unable to start
it when he returned. Hornbeck and two other men returned to the auto-
mobile, threw some sacks and satchels into the trunk and attemped to start
it, without success. The police officers approached the car and ordered Horn-
beck to get out. One of the officers then asked Hornbeck what he was doing
in the area, but Hornbeck remained silent.2 Hornbeck was then arrested.
At Hornbeck's trial for burglary and stealing, the arresting officer testi-
fied, over objection, that the defendant "wouldn't answer any questions"3
32. 56 T.C. 1190, 1197 (1971).
33. 3 MERTENS, supra note 18, § 22.41.
34. See, e.g., Estate of Aaron v. Commissioner, 224 F.2d 314 (3d Cir. 1955);
Routzahn v. Brown, 95 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1938). Since the theory of the federal
estate tax is to tax transfers made at death, the decision as to whether an arrange-
ment is in substance a testamentary disposition indicates whether such an
arrangement is within the scope of the statute.
35. Skifter has been severely criticized. See, e.g., Note, Estate Taxation of
Life Insurance Policies Held by the Insured as Trustee, 32 MD. L. Rlv. 805
(1972); Note, Broad Fiduciary Powers Acquired, Rather Than Retained, by an
Insured Over Life Insurance Policies Do Not Constitute Incidents of Owner-
ship Under § 2042(2) Unless the Insured Can Exercise Them for His Own
Economic Benefit, 48 N.D. LAw. 995 (1973).
1. 492 S.W.2d 802 (Mo. 1973).
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when he was asked what he had been doing in the neighborhood. On appeal
following his conviction defendant contended, inter alia, that the court's
admission of this testimony violated his constitutional right to remain silent
and that this evidence was "highly prejudicial and objectionable' 4 The
supreme court dismissed Hornbeck's constitutional argument summarily,
holding that "[s] ilence of the accused when not under arrest, and in circum-
stances where only a guilty person would remain silent, may be shown."5
Another objection to such testimony, not specifically raised by defendant
or addressed by the court, is that it is hearsay. One of the standard excep-
tions to the hearsay rule is that statements which constitute admissions of
parties are admissible to prove the truth of the contents of such statements.6
A subcategory of this rule is the so-called tacit admission rule which makes
admissible evidence that a party remained silent in the face of an accusatory
statement to which a reasonable man would have proclaimed his innocence7
Because a defendant's silence is viewed as an assent to,8 or adoption of,9 the
speaker's accusation, it is an admission and falls within the hearsay exception.
If the accusatory statement is not one to which an innocent person would
respond, then defendants silence in the face of it lacks significant probative
value and is irrelevant. Although no Missouri court has explicitly cited the
considerations determining the relevancy of defendant's silence, an analysis
of Missouri decisions and other jurisdictions reveals that one or more of the
following are important: (1) The accusatory statement was made in the
presence of the accused; 10 (2) the statement was heard and understood by
the accused;" (3) the accusatory statement was made by a party to the
transaction or by someone to whose statement the accused could be expected
to reply, and not by a mere third party;' 2 (4) the veracity of the accusatory
4. Id. at 808.
5. Id. Since the accused was determined not to be under arrest or custodialinterrogation, he had a duty to speak. If the defendant was under custodial inter-
rogation, the prior administration of a Miranda warning would not, of course,
render the tacit admission admissible, as it would in the case of an oral admission.
In support of Hornbeck are numerous Missouri cases which hold that the
silence of the accused when not under arrest and in circumstances such that only
a guilty person would remain silent may be shown as evidence of the accused'sguilt. See, e.g., State v. Woods, 484 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Mo. 1968); State v.Phelps, 384 S.W.2d 616, 621 (Mo. 1964). The federal courts in Missouri support
this position also. Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 869 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,820 U.S. 788 (1943). Reports of civil cases on this question in Missouri are scarce.
For civil cases in other jurisdictions see Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d 1099 (1960).
6. See C. McComucx, LAw oF EvIDENCE § 262 (2d ed. 1972).
7. See id. §§ 269, 270.
8. Id. § 270.
9. MODEL CODE OF EviDENCE, rule 507, comment (a) (1942).
10. See State ex rel. Tiffany v. Ellison, 266 Mo. 604, 182 S.W. 996 (1916).
11. See State v. Phelps, 884 S.W.2d 616 (Mo. 1964); People v. Briggs, 24
Cal. Rptr. 417, 874 P.2d 257 (1962); Quillin v. Colquhoun, 42 Idaho 522, 247
P. 740 (1926); Wheeler v. Le Roy, 296 IMI. 579, 180 N.E. 880 (1921); Common-
wealth v. Kenney, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 235 (1847); State ex rel. Tiffany v. Ellison,
266 Mo. 604, 182 S.W. 996 (1916); State v. Murray, 126 Mo. 611, 29 S.W. 700
(1895).
12. For cases holding that if the statement is made by a mere stranger to the
transaction, the accused may regard the statement as an impertinence and need
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statement was ascertainable by the accused;13 (5) the accused was physically
at liberty to reply to the accusatory statement; 14 (6) the statement was one
which, by its nature, called for a reply from the accused; 15 (7) the accused's
silence could fairly be construed as an admission of guilt;' 6 and (8) other
miscellaneous circumstances were not such as would rebut any inference
of assent which might otherwise have arisen from the accused's silence.'7
The court did not analyze the circumstances surrounding Hornbeck's
silence in the above terms, concluding simply that Hornbeck had "a duty to
answer the officer's legitimate inquiry made in the course of a routine
investigation, prior to arrest."' 8 Doubtless, however, an analysis using the
foregoing factors would have reached the same result.' 9
not reply, see Commonwealth v. Kenney, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 235 (1847);
Creager v. Chilson, 453 S.W.2d 941 (Mo. 1970); Keim v. Blackburn, 280 S.W.
1046 (Mo. 1926); State ex tel. Tiffany v. Ellison, 266 Mo. 604, 182 S.W. 996
(1916); State v. Murray, 126 Mo. 611, 29 S.W. 700( 1895); State v. Young, 99
Mo. 666, 12. S.W. 879 (1890); Phillips v. Towlers Admr., 23 Mo. 401 (1856);
Greenberg v. Stanley, 30 N. J. 485, 158 A.2 d 833 (1959). For cases holding that
such a statement when made by a police officer before arrest is not an imperti-
nence and merits a reply see Smith v. Duncan, 181 Mass. 485, 63 N.E. 988
(1902); State v. Rush, 286 S.W.2d 767 (Mo. 1956).
18. See Commonwealth v. Kenney, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 235 (1847); State
v. Foley, 144 Mo. 600, 46 S.W. 783 (1898).
14. See People v. Briggs, 24 Cal. Rptr. 417, 374 P.2d 257 (1962) (accused
must have an opportunity to reply); Commonwealth v. Kenney, 53 Mass. (12
Met.) 235 (1847) (accused must be at liberty to reply); State v. Phelps, 384
S.W.2d 616 (Mo. 1964) (accused must be physically able to reply); Klever v.
Elliott, 212 Ore. 490, 320 P.2d 268 (1958) (confusion or excitement following an
accident may justify a failure to reply).
15. See Whaley v. Crutchfield, 226 Ark. 921, 294 S.W.2d 775 (1956);
Gerulis v. Viens, 130 Me. 378, 156 A. 378 (1931); Commonwealth v. Kenney,
53 Mass. (12 Met.) 235 (1847); Keim v. Blackburn, 280 S.W. 1046 (Mo. 1926);
State ex rel. Tiffany v. Ellison, 266 Mo. 604, 182 S.W. 996 (1916) (statement
shouted from an adjoining room by third party to the transaction did not call for
a reply); State v. Murray, 126 Mo. 611, 29 S.W. 700 (1895); State v. Glahn, 97
Mo. 679, 11 S.W. 260 (1889).
16. See State v. Hamilton, 55 Mo. 520 (1874).
17. See Creager v. Chilson, 453 S.W.2d 941 (Mo. 1970), where the court
considered the youth and the highly emotional state of the defendant in deter-
mining the admissibility of this type of evidence.
18. 492 S.W.2d at 808. In State v. Rush, 286 S.W.2d 767 (Mo. 19,56),
police officers with probable cause to believe a crime had been committed stopped
the defendant and asked him for identification. They then asked the defendant
what he was doing in the neighborhood. When the defendant failed to reply to
this question, the officer placed him under arrest. The court held that the evi-
dence of the accused's silence while not under arrest or in custody was admissible,
since the officer's inquiry was not one of impertinence deserving of no reply, and
also because the defendant's failure to explain his presence in the neighborhood
under the circumstances was one element leading to his arrest. Id. at 771-72.
19. E.g., (1) The question asked of Hornbeck was essentially accusatory
and was asked in his presence; (2) Hornbeck apparently heard and understood
the question; (3) a police officer, who is one to whom Hornbeck could be
expected to reply, asked the question; (4) the veracity of the statement was with-
in Hornbeck's knowledge; (5) Hornbeck was physically at liberty to reply; (6) the
question was one which naturally called for a reply; (7) Hornbeck's silence in
response to the question could be fairly construed as an admission of guilt, since
[Vol. 39
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Contrasting somewhat with Hornbeck is Creager v. Chilson.20 There
the 17-year-old defendant drove her automobile into an intersection and
made a left turn which caused plaintiffs vehicle to swerve out of its lane and
collide head-on with an oncoming automobile. A police officer investigating
the accident attempted to talk to the defendant but could not do so because
she was upset and crying. Shortly thereafter, an acquaintance asked the
defendant and her stepsister, who was a passenger in defendant's auto-
mobile, what had happened. At trial plaintiff offered evidence that one of
the two girls-the witness was not certain which-replied to this question
by saying that they had pulled out in front of the plaintiffs automobile and
thus caused the accident. The plaintiff argued that the statement was an
admission if made by the defendant, or was a tacit admission if made by
her passenger, because the defendant failed to refute it. The trial court
refused this offer of proof.21
The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's refusal to admit
this evidence. One of the reasons it did so was because the evidence was
merely cumulative. 22 Another was that the circumstances were not such as
to clearly call for a replyY'3 Analysis of Chilson through the above factors
indicates that the court reached the correct conclusion as to the relevancy
of defendant's silence.24 More significantly, the court emphasized that tacit
admissions generally are weak in probative force,25 and said that "because
of the uncertainty which attends interpreting a person's silence as an implied
admission of a statement made, such evidence is considered by the courts
'as dangerous and to be received with caution:""26 Yet, in Hornbeck, the
admission of evidence of a criminal defendant's silence was affirmed without
discussion of the surrounding circumstances or the probative force of
such evidence.27
One might quarrel with Hornbeck on three grounds. First, the court
failed to discuss the meaning of the defendant's silence. Evidence of silence
if Hornbeck had an innocent explanation for his presence in the neighborhood
under the given circumstances he presumably would have offered it; and (8) the
court determined that Hornbeck was not yet in police custody or under arrest at
the time the question was asked.
20. 458 S.W.2d 941 (Mo. 1970).
21. Id. at 943.
22. Id. at 944.
23. Id. at 943-44.
24. It is uncertain that the defendant heard or understood the statement,
the statement was made by a stranger to the transaction and could thereby be
regarded as an impertinence, the defendant was very young and in a highly
excited emotional state, and the statement was made during the confusion
surrounding an automobile accident, and thus did not necessarily call for a reply.
See Kiever v. Elliott, 212 Ore. 490, 320 P.2d 263 (1958), where the court
rejected evidence of the defendant's silence following a similar accusatory state-
ment when it was made in the confusion following an automobile accident.
25. 453 S.W.2d at 948.
26. Id. at 944, quoting 29 Am. Jun. 21 Evidence § 633. The uncertainty of
interpreting the silence was underscored in State v. Dowling, 348 Mo. 589, 154
S.W.2d 749 (1941), where the court stated that if the accused is in doubt about
his rights, as Hornbeck may well have been, silence in the face of an accusatory
statement may not be used against him. See text accompanying notes 30-32 infra.
27. 492 S.W.2d at 808.
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in the face of an accusatory statement is hearsay, and it is within the admis-
sions exception to the hearsay rule only if it is in fact an admission, i.e., if
the defendant was actually consenting to or adopting the statement or if he
believed he was guilty and thought any response would tend to incriminate
him. More fundamentally perhaps, the silence is relevant to the lawsuit as
evidence of guilt only if defendant's silence was motivated by guilt. But
there are other motivations the defendant may have for remaining silent.
For example, he may be in doubt about his rights, 28 he simply may not wish
to communicate anything to the police at that time, or the statement may
not be of such a nature as to induce a response. In such cases the silence is
not relevant as evidence of guilt. And, "inquiry into the motive of silence
... is so difficult that no accurate results can be expected."29 Assuming that
the meaning of a particular defendant's silence cannot be ascertained with
certainty, it is preferable to exclude all evidence of silence, even where
relevant, rather than to admit evidence of silence, even where irrelevant.
A second criticism of Hornbeck is that the defendant was likely in police
custody when the question was asked.30 Hombeck's "admission" would
therefore have been inadmissible because (1) a Miranda warning did not
precede the question, and (2) he had the right to remain silent. Being in
custody means that one is not free to depart.3 1 It is highly doubtful that
Hornbeck could have done so.
There is another constitutional problem in applying the tacit admis-
sions rule against Hornbeck, or any criminal defendant, regardless of whether
they are under arrest or in custody-it may violate the 5th and 14th amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination.3 2 The right of a defendant to
remain silent once he is under arrest or in custody is well settled. Not so
clear is whether there is a constitutional privilege against self-incrimination
28. See State v. Dowling, 348 Mo. 589, 599, 154 S.W.2d 749, 755 (1941),
and cases cited n.5 therein.
29. C. McConMIcK, supra note 6, at 355.
80. In State v. Kissinger, 343 Mo. 781, 123 S.W.2d 81 (1939), the defen-
dant was arrested for driving an automobile while intoxicated. Although he had
not yet been placed under arrest, his automobile had run out of gasoline, so he
was physically unable to leave the control of the arresting officers. The court
stated gat his silence in the face of his wife's statement that he was driving was
inadmissible because the defendant was at least constructively in police custody.
Id. at 785-86, 123 S.W.2d at 83.
81. "By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforce-
ment officprs after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
444 (1966).
32. The fifth amendment states that a person may not "be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself" (U.S. CONST. amend. V.), and says
nothing about self-incrimination. This language could be interpreted as limiting
the privilege to judicial proceedings only, which clearly would not include the
investigatory stage. Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966, conceded that the constitutional language did not limit the
application of the fifth amendment to judicial proceedings.
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at an earlier stage, the investigatory stage.33 Davis v. Mississippi 4 makes
clear that the 4th and 14th amendment prohibitions against unreasonable
searches and seizures apply during the investigatory stage.35 Unreasonable
searches and seizures have a great potential of being "wholesale intrusions
upon the personal security"30 of citizens, however, and hence the protection
of the 4th and 14th amendments may be broader than that of the 5th amend-
ment. Yet, in Davis the Court said that the police have no right to compel
answers from persons during the investigatory stage.3 7 This would indicate
that the privilege against self-incrimination does apply at that time.38
Assuming the fifth amendment is applicable, the circumstances attend-
ing the defendant's silent "admission" must meet the constitutional require-
ments applicable to oral admissions. The admissibility of a defendant's oral
admission has always depended on whether it is voluntary. Silence in the
face of an accusatory statement is a voluntary admission only if motivated
by a genuine desire to consent to or adopt the statement. As noted, silence
under these circumstances is more likely motivated by a desire to commun-
icate nothing, and seldom is motivated by a desire to communicate guilt.8 9
Allowing silence to be evidence of guilt gives a guilty defendant a choice
between lying; making an oral admission, making a silent admission, or
running away. Thus, he is in effect compelled to incriminate himself because
he has no alternative that does not result in an inference of guilt.
33. The post-Miranda cases have sanctioned the use of tacit admissions
before arrest or custodial interrogation. See, e.g., State v. Saiz, 103 Ariz. 567, 447
P.2d 541 (1968); People v. Tolbert, 70 Cal. 2d 790, 76 Cal. Rptr. 445, 452 P.2d
661 (1969); State v. McClain, 254 La. 56, 222 So. 2d 855 (1969); State v.
Thomas, 440 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1969). In none of the cases was the accusatory
statement made by a police officer in the course of an investigation.
C. McComvncx, supra note 6, at 355, apparently assumes that the fifth
amendment is broad enough to apply to the investigatory stage.
84. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
35. "[T]o argue that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the investi-
gatory stage is fundamentally to misconceive the purposes of the Fourth Amend-
ment." Id. at 726.
36. Id.
37. Footnote six states:
The state relies on various statements in our cases which approve general
questioning of citizens in the course of investigating a crime. See Miranda
v. Arizona, 884 U.S. 436, 477-78 (1966); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367
U.S. 568, 635 (concurring opinion) (1961). But these statements merely
reiterated the settled principle that while the police have the right to
request citizens to answer voluntarily questions concerning unsolved
crimes they have no right to compel them to answer.
394 U.S. 721, 727 n.6 (1969) (Emphasis added). The tacit admission rule in
effect compels an answer because it compels the defendant to take one of several
courses of action, all of which can be used as evidence of guilt.
38. See generally C. McConwacx, supra note 6, at 854-56.
39. It is probable that
inquiry into the motive of silence, since silence is inaction, is so difficult
that no accurate results can be expected. And in that event, either the
voluntariness requirement must be abandoned in this context or the
danger of involuntariness must be regarded as sufficiently high to exclude
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Missouri courts have indicated that the admissibility of tacit admissions
is primarily for the trial court.40 The trial judge does have a good perspective
from which to gauge the probative value of such evidence in the particular
context in issue. It is submitted, however, that silence should never be
admissible as evidence of guilt against a criminal defendant.
Am.nmm E. FmurMoaE II
JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS-BIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP
LaGarce v. Mouldon1
August LaGarce transferred a savings and loan certificate to himself
and James and Leona Mouldon, in their presence, "as joint tenants with
right of survivorship and not as tenants in common." No consideration was
given. The certificate provided that deposits "shall be conclusively intended
to be a gift"2 to the other joint tenants, and that the bearer thereof could
make withdrawals without the others' consent. LaGarce, declaring that he
wished to be able to withdraw funds whenever he needed them, delivered
the certificate to the Mouldons with the statement that he knew they would
not cash it. James agreed to return the certificate on request. Some months
later, LaGarce attempted unsuccessfully to transfer the account without
possession of the certificate. He then requested Leona to return it; because
LaGarce was very close to death, however, Leona refused, believing that
LaGarce had intended that she and James have the money after he died.
LaGarce died the next day.3
LaGarce's executrix brought a discovery of assets proceeding in the
probate court,4 and a judgment on the pleadings ordering return of the
certificate resulted. The court based its holding on the theory that the
transfer had not satisfied requirements for a common law joint tenancy."
The circuit court affirmed. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed, holding
that common law requirements need not be met where a joint tenancy is
created pursuant to section 369.150 of the Missouri Revised Statutes.6
all silences on this ground. In view of the high probability that silence
is, in these situations, in fact motivated by a desire not to communicate
any reaction to the assertion (and thus in effect to assert the privilege
against compelled self-incrimination), a blanket rule of exclusion might
well be most appropriate.
C. McConmicK, supra note 6, at 855.
40. See McCarty v. Bishop, 281 Mo. App. 604, 102 S.W.2d 126 (K.C. Ct.
App, 1937); Klever v. Elliott, 212 Ore. 490, 320 P.2d 268 (1958).
1. 487 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. En Bane 1972).
2. Id. at 495.
3. Id. at 497.
4. §§ 473.843-.857, RSMo 1969, repealed and superseded by § 473.340,
RSMo 1973.
5. 487 S.W.2d 493, 497.
6. In the absence of fraud, undue influence, mental incapacity, or mistake.
1. An association may issue membership certificates in the name of
two or more persons, whether minor or adult, and provide for
(Vol. 39
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Several methods have been used in Missouri to establish accounts in
more than one name. An agency account is created when deposits are made
by A and authority is given to B to make withdrawals.7 Such accounts are
usually established for the convenience of A and B is accountable for with-
drawals. Ownership problems may result if the agency is unclear in the
account instrument." The "pay on death" account is created by A to be paid
to B upon A's death.9 Such language is not effective in Missouri,' 0 absent
payment to any one or more of them, or the survivor or survivors
of them.
2. Such account, and any additions made thereto by any of them,
shall become the property of such persons as joint tenants and
shall be held for the exclusive use of the persons so named and
may be paid to any person named therein, or the survivor or
survivors of them.
3. And such payment and the receipt of acquittance of the one to
whom such payment is made shall be a valid and sufficient release
and discharge to said association, whether any one or more of
the persons named be living or dead, for all payments so made by
the association on such account prior to the acknowledgment of
receipt by, or service by an officer empowered to make service of
process upon, said association at its home office of notice in
writing signed by any one of such joint tenants not to pay such
account in accordance with the terms thereof.
4. If there are more than two persons named in such membership
certificate and one of such persons dies, the account represented
by such certificate shall become the property of the survivors
as joint tenants. Such a joint account shall create a single member-
ship in an association.
Section 362.470, RSMo 1969, involving banks and trust companies, is to the
same effect:
When a deposit is made by any person in the name of the depositor
and any one or more other persons, whether minor or adult, and "in
form to be paid" to any one or more of them, or the survivor or survivors
of them, the deposits thereupon and any additions thereto made by
any of these persons, upon the making thereof, shall become the prop-
erty of these persons as joint tenants, and the same, together with all
interest thereon, shall be held for the exclusive use of the persons so
named, and may be paid to any of them, or to the survivor or survivors
of them; and the payment and the receipt or the acquittance of the one
to whom the payment is made shall be a valid and sufficient release and
discharge to the bank or trust company, whether any one or more of the
persons named is dead or alive, for all payments made on account of
such deposit prior to the receipt by the bank or trust company of notice
in writing signed by any one of the joint tenants not to pay the deposit
in accordance with the terms thereof. If more than two persons are
named as such depositors and one of them dies, the deposit becomes the
property of the survivors as joint tenants. (Emphasis added).
Although only § 869.150 was under consideration in LaGarce, the court expressly
stated § 862.470 is the same as § 869.150 "in all material respects." 487 S.W.2d
at 499. The discussion in this note is equally applicable to both. But of. §§ 370.287
(credit union shares); § 369.485 (federal savings and loan companies).
7. See Schrader, Bank Deposits as Will Substitutes in Missouri, 28 Mo.
L. R v. 482, 498 (1963).
8. Schnur v. Dunker, 88 S.W.2d 282 (St. L. Mo. App. 1931).
9. See Schrader, supra note 7 at 486.
10. Bank v. Kutz, 276 S.W.2d 593 (St. L. Mo. App. 1955).
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independent facts establishing a gift or trust.11 The "Totten Trust"12 is
created by A, trustee, for B, the beneficiary; the terms of the trust are not
stated. The trust is presumed to be revocable during the trustee's lifetime,
but upon his death the trust is presumed irrevocable.13 The effectiveness of
this form in Missouri is unclear. 14
La Garce's deposit was in form payable to A or B or the survivor. This
is the statutory joint tenancy form set out in section 369.150.15 The plain
meaning of this section is that use of the statutory language creates a joint
tenancy. Cases prior to LaGarce interpreting section 369.15016 and section
362.47017 had not followed this plain meaning, nor had the legislature
reacted to the case law interpretation.
Joint account statutes similar to Missouri's are given various interpre-
tations.'8 Some are interpreted as merely protecting banks from liability
11. Butler State Bank v. Duncan, 319 S.W.2d 913 (K.C. Mo. App. 1959).
12. Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904).
13. SCOTT ON TrusTs § 58 (3d ed. 1967); RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF
TnusTs § 58 (1959).
14. Schrader, supra note 7, at 486.
15. See statute quoted note 6 supra.
16. Cases dealing with joint savings and loan accounts under § 369.150:
In re Estate of Bareikowski, 480 S.W.2d 877 (Mo. 1972); Wantuck v. United
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 461 S.W.2d 692 (Mo. En Banc 1971); Jenkins v. Meyer,
880 S.W.2d 315 (Mo. 1964); In re Patterson's Estate, 348 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. 1961);
Young v. Knell, 423 S.W.2d 28 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967); Melton v. Ensley, 421
S.W.2d 44 (Spr. Mo. App. 1967); Jackson Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Seabaugh, 395
S.W. 2d 260 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965); Weber v. Jones, 240 Mo. App. 914, 222
S.W.2d 957 (1949).
17. Cases dealing with joint bank and trust company accounts under §
362.470 and predecessor statutes: Ison v. Ison, 410 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. 1967); In re
Estate of O'Neal, 409 S.W.2d 85 (Mo. 1966); Leuzinger v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, 396 S.W.2d 570 (Mo. En Banc 1965); Dalton v. Amer.
Natl Bank, 309 S.W.2d 571 (Mo. 1958); Commerce Trust Co. v. Watts, 360
Mo. 971, 231 S.W.2d 817 (1950); In re Kaimann's Estate, 360 Mo. 544, 229
S.W.2d 527 (1950); Clevidence v. Mercantile Home Bank & Trust Co., 355 Mo.
904, 199 S.W.2d 1 (1947); Simon v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 346 Mo. 146,
139 S.W.2d 1002 (1940); Bunker v. Fidelity Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 335 Mo.
305, 73 S.W.2d 242 (1934); Murphy v. Wolfe, 329 Mo. 545, 45 S.W.2d 1079(En Banc 1932); Ambruster v. Ambruster, 326 Mo. 51, 31 S.W.2d 28 (1930);
Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Smith, 320 Mo. 989, 9 S.W.2d 58 (1928); In re
Estate of Kroeger, 490 S.W.2d 407 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972); In re Estate of
Hitchcock, 483 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972); First Nat'l Bank v. Waller,
442 S.W.2d 171 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969); Newcomb v. Farmer, 360 S.W.2d 272
(St. L. Mo. App. 1962); Cranford v. Langston, 356 S.W.2d 581 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1962); Princeton State Bank v. Wayman, 271 S.W.2d 600 (K.C. Mo. App.
1954); Connor v. Temm, 270 S.W.2d 541 (St. L. Mo. App. 1954); Clay County
State Bank v. Simrall, 259 S.W.2d 422 (K.C. Mo. App. 1953); State Bank v.
Coleman, 241 Mo. App. 600, 240 S.W.2d 188 (1951); Mercantile Bank v.
Haley, 179 S.W.2d 916 (St. L. Mo. App. 1944); In re Geels Estate, 143 S.W.2d
327 (St. L. Mo. App. 1940); Melinik v. Meier, 124 S.W.2d 594 (St. L. Mo. App.
1939); Schnur v. Dunker, 38 S.W.2d 282 (St. L. Mo. App. 1931); Lafayette-
South Side Bank & Trust Co. v. Siefert, 223 Mo. App. 431, 18 S.W.2d 572 (1929);
Ball v. Mercantile Trust Co., 220 Mo. App. 1165. 297 S.W. 415 (1927).
18. Kepner, The Joint and Survivorship Bank Account-A Concept Without
a Name, 41 C.lIF. L. tR~v. 596 (1953); Kepner, Five More Years Of The Joint
Bank Account Muddle, 26 U. Cm. L. REv. 376 (1959); See Annots., 43 A.L.R.3d
971 (1972), 149 A.L.R. 879 (1944), 135 A.L.R. 993 (1941); 103 A.L.R. 1123
(1936), 66 A.L.R. 881 (1930), 48 A.L.R. 189 (1927).
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and do not create any presumption of joint tenancy.1 9 Others raise a rebut-
table presumption of joint tenancy if the statutory language is used. This
second class has three subgroups. First, some hold the presumption vanishes
upon any evidence of contrary intent; the burden of going forward with
the evidence is then on the party relying on the statutory language.20 The
second subgroup holds the presumption can only be overcome by clear and
convincing evidence.21 The third subgroup finds that absence of the elements
of a completed gift rebuts the presumption.2 2 The third major interpretation
finds intent to create a joint tenancy conclusive when the statutory language
is used.23 This can be overcome by showing fraud, duress, undue influence,
or mistake.24
Before LaGarce the effect of the Missouri statutes was to create a rebut-
table presumption of a joint tenancy25 based on the theory that the transac-
tion represented a gift from the depositor to the named co-depositor(s).26
The effect of this presumption was simply to relieve the surviving co-
depositor from the burden of proving the elements of a common law gift.
The presumption was rebutted by evidence that a trust or some other
disposition had been intended or that a valid gift was in fact not made.27
19. O'Hair v. O'Hair, 109 Ariz. 286, 508 P.2d 66 (1978); Stewart v. Stewart,
228 Ga. 517, 186 S.E.2d 746 (1972); In re Estate of Stamets, 260 Iowa 93, 148
N.W.2d 468 (1967); Chase v. Reid, 82 Idaho 1, 348 P.2d 473 (1960).
20. Erickson v. Kalman, 291 Minn. 41, 189 N.W.2d 381 (1971).
21. Guilds v. Monroe County Bank, 41 Mich. 616, 200 N.W.2d 769 (1972);
Klostergaard v. Peterson, 169 N.W.2d 259 (S.D. 1969); In re Estate of Michaels,
26 Wis. 2d 382, 132 N.W.2d 557 (1965).
22. Maier v. Brown, 189 So. 2d 380 (Fla. App. 1966); Murgic v. Granite
City Trust & Say. Bank, 31 IMI. 2d 587, 202 N.E.2d 470 (1964).
23. Tesch v. Miller, 227 Ark. 74, 296 S.W.2d 392 (1956); Van Pelt v. West
Essex Say. & Loan Ass'n, 91 N.J. Super. 164, 219 A.2d 527 (1966).
24. Cases cited note 23 supra.
25. Ball v. Mercantile Trust Co., 220 Mo. App. 1165, 297 S.W. 415 (1927);
cases cited note 16 supra. The notion that the presumption was rebuttable was
borrowed from Clary v. Fitzgerald, 155 App. Div. 659, 140 N.Y.S. 539 (1913).
Clary interpreted § 249, para. 3, CONSOLIDATED LAws OF NEw YoBx (1909),
from which then § 11779, RSMo 1919, predecessor to § 362.470, RSMo 1969,
was derived.
26. Jenkins v. Meyer, 380 S.W.2d 315 (Mo. 1964), and cases therein cited.
The following cases hold that no statutory presumption arises where
"right of survivorship" is not expressly reserved: Ison v. Ison, 410 S.W.2d 65(Mo. 1967); Leuzinger v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, 396 S.W.2d
570 (Mo. En Banc 1965); Jenkins v. Meyer, 880 S.W.2d 315 (Mo. 1964);
Murphy v. Wolfe, 329 Mo. 545, 45 S.W.2d 1079 (En Banc 1932); Jackson
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Seabaugh, 395 S.W.2d 260 (St. L. Mo. A p. 1965); New-
comb v. Farmer, 860 S.W.2d 272 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962); Crawford v. Langston,
356 S.W.2d 581 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962); Princeton State Bank v. Wayman, 271
S.W.2d 600 (K.C. Mo. App. 1954).
27. See, e.g., Schnur v. Dunker, 38 S.W.2d 282 (St. L. Mo. App. 1931),
where the intention to create an agency account was proved. In Wantuck v.
United Say. & Loan Ass'n, 461 S.W.2d 692 (Mo. En Banc 1971), the court
required, for an effective delivery, that the survivor, a church, have knowledge
of the account. This rendered uncertain the cases that presumed delivery where
a close family relationship existed. Longacre v. Knowles, 833 S.W.2d 67 (Mo.
1960); Wahl v. Wahl, 857 Mo. 89, 206 S.W.2d 334 (1937); Napier v. Eigel,
850 Mo. 111, 164 S.W.2d 908 (1942); Commonwealth Trust Co. v. DuMontimer,
193 Mo. App. 290, 183 S.W. 1137 (1916).
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Thus, in Jenkins v. Meyer28 the presumption was rebutted and the gift failed
when the executrix proved a lack of delivery and donative intent.29
The interpretation of the joint bank account statutes was further com-
plicated by the common law rule that a gift to one in a confidential relation-
ship with the donor was presumed to be invalid.30 This presumption was
based on the donee's supposed opportunity to exert undue influence on the
donor to procure the gift.31 The donee in such cases could sustain the gift
by proving a lack of undue influence, i.e., by proving donative intent.32 The
presumption of a valid gift in the joint bank account statutes thus con-
flicted with the common law presumption of invalidity of the gift where
the confidential relationship existed. In In re Estate of Barcikowski33 the
Missouri Supreme Court held that in such a case the statutory presumption
of a joint tenancy did not come into play; the donee must establish the
validity of the gift.34
In LaGarce the court found that treating the statutes as creating a
rebuttable presumption of a valid gift violated the statutes' plain meaning,
and cases so treating them were overruled.35 La Garce held that compliance
with the statutes conclusively establishes a "statutory" joint tenancy, in the
absence of fraud, undue influence, mental incapacity, or mistake.36 Under
this holding survivorship is not defeated by a showing that the transaction
lacked the elements of a gift or that another result was intended. The ital-
icized phrase, however, leaves in doubt the status of Barcikowski and similar
cases. The doubt is primarily as to the burden of going forward with the
28. 380 S.W.2d 315 (Mo. 1964).
29. Id. at 321.
30. In re Estate of Barcikowski, 480 S.W.2d 877 (Mo. 1972) (son-donee
cashed checks, paid bills, and drove for his father); In re Patterson's Estate, 348
S.W.2d 6 (Mo. 1961) (cousin-donee managed invalid donor's financial affairs
and performed personal services); In re Kaimann's Estate, 360 Mo. 54, 229 S.W.2d
527 (1950) (son-donee made decedent's income tax returns, kept his books, and
managed his affairs generally). In all three cases the donor's illness or infirmity
was a factor.
The Missouri definition of a confidential relationship is from Selle v.
Wrigley, 233 Mo. App. 43, 116 S.W.2d 217 (K.C. Ct. App. 1938):
It may therefore be said that a confidential relationship exists between
two persons, whether their relations be such as are technically fiduciary
or merely informal, whenever one trusts in and relies on the other. The
question in such case is always whether or not trust is reposed.
Id. at 50, 116 S.W.2d at 221.
31. Cases cited note 30 supra.
32. See, e.g., In re Kaimann's Estate, 360 Mo. 544, 551, 229 S.W.2d 527,
530 (1950).
38. 480 S.W.2d 877 (Mo. 1972).
34. Id. at 879. Other cases in which undue influence invalidated the joint
tenancy are Clay County State Bank v. Simrall, 259 S.W.2d 422 (K.C. Mo. App.
1953); Weber v. Jones, 240 Mo. App. 914, 222 S.W.2d 957 (1949); In re GeelsEstate, 143 S.W.2d 327 (St. L. Mo. App. 1940).
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evidence, 37 but also includes the validity of the common law presumption
which arises from proof of a confidential relationship. 8
LaGarce makes available in Missouri a new and convenient method of
avoiding probate. 39 When the statutory language is used "the survivingjoint tenant should... be held... owner of the deposit even though the
donor may have intended to retain the beneficial interest in the account
during his life time."40 A depositor can thus retain a beneficial interest for
life, cash in the certificate at any time 41 and be assured that ownership
of the account will pass to the surviving joint tenants on his death.
Missouri looks to the parties' intent to determine who controls the
account during the depositor's lifetime.42 Any doubts can be resolved by
requiring possession of the certificate to make withdrawals while the
depositor is still alive.43 The question of the rights of creditors to the funds
while the depositor is alive remains unresolved.
Where nonstatutory language is used common law joint tenancy require-
ments must be satisfied.44 Although mistake of law may be a ground for
defeating a statutory joint tenancy,45 it is doubtful that this theory could be
used to establish a joint tenancy where the statutory language was mistak-
enly omitted.46 Therefore, it is necessary that depositors be aware of the
implications of the language used.
87. It would be logical to infer from La~arce that the estate would have
to come forward with evidence of undue influence, etc., once the survivor has
established the statutory account. The burden of persuasion in such circumstances
is unclear.
38. See note 30 supra.
39. Thus, Missouri estate planners have a new "poor man's trust" device.Insurance policies may avoid probate; United States savings bonds can bepayable to A if living, and, if not, to B [see Treas. Reg. 1.315.7a; Valentine v.
St. Louis Union Trust Co., 250 S.W.2d 167 (Mo. 1952)]; realty can be con-
veyed by quit claim deed as in Julius v. Buckner, 452 S.W.2d 139 (Mo. 1970),
enabling the grantor to retain most incidents of ownership, including power to
convey the land, and pass the residue to the named grantees. Trustees' fees may be
avoided through these techniques, which are adequate for most moderate estates.
40. 487 S.W.2d at 500-01.
41. Id. at 500. See Carroll v. Hahn, 498 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Mo. App., D. St.
L. 1973).
42. Carroll v. Hahn, 498 S.W.2d 602, 607 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973).
43. Welch v. North Hills Bank, 442 S.W.2d 98, (K.C. Mo. App. 1969).
44. Common law joint tenancy theory has been unsuccessful because no
unity of interest exists where one depositor controls the account. Jenkins v. Meyer,380 S.W.2d 315 (Mo. 1964). Attempts to establish a third party beneficiary
contract payable on death have been unsuccessful. Longacre v. Knowles, 333S.W.2d 67 (Mo. 1960). See Fratcher, Trusts and Succession in Missouri, 25 Mo.L. REv. 417 (1960), suggesting that such a theory could be allowed if KansasCity Life Ins. Co. v. Rainey, 853 Mo. 477, 182 S.W.2d 624 (1944) is followed.
See generally Schrader, supra note 7.
45. 487 S.W.2d at 500.
46. Jenkins v. Meyer, 380 S.W.2d 315 (Mo. 1964); Melton v. Ensley, 421
S.W.2d 44 (Spr. Mo. App. 1967).
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Under the Uniform Probate Code47 nonprobate transfers48 can be made
through joint accounts, payment on death accounts, and trust accounts. Joint
accounts become the property of the survivor 9 absent clear and convincing
evidence of other intent60 Payment on death accounts5' effectively transfer
ownership to the survivor.5 2 Trust accounts in the form of Matter of Totten53
also pass title to beneficiaries on the "trustee's" death, absent clear and
convincing evidence of contrary intent.54
The Uniform Probate Code provides for lifetime ownership of joint
accounts to the extent of the net contribution of each party,55 absent
clear and convincing evidence of contrary intent.56 Payment on death
accounts conclusively belong to the original depositor during his lifetime. If
two or more are named as original depositors, joint account rules apply.57
Trust accounts are presumed revocable during the trustee's lifetime absent
clear and convincing evidence of an irrevocable trust.6 s
In conclusion, using "to either/or the survivor" in a joint savings and
loan account now conclusively establishes joint tenancy, absent fraud, mis-
take, undue influence, or mental incapacity. Dictum in LaGarce implies that
the same treatment would be given to bank and trust accounts in statutory
form. 9 As a result, a depositor may now safely create a joint tenancy,
control the funds for life, and pass them to the survivor.
ARTmHR S. HAsELTINE
47. H.B. 293 §§ 6-101-6-113, which have been adopted in Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, Idaho, and North Dakota.
48. See Greenfield & Vandivort, Non-Probate Transfers Under the Uniform
Probate Code, 29 J. Mo. BA 109 (March 1973). The UNIFoRMu PROBATE CODE
,refers creditors of the transferor's estate over survivors if the estate is insolvent,
6-107. Financial institutions are not liable for payments made to transferors
after death of the depositor under §§ 6-108-6-112. In addition, financial institu-
tions have a right of set-off against any party that has or had before his death
a right to immediate withdrawal, § 6-113.
49. UIFoRM PROBATE CODE § 6-104 (a).
50. Id. § 6-101 (4).
51. Id. § 6-108.
52. Id. § 6-104 (b).
53. 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904).
54. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 6-104 (c).
55. Id. § 6-103 (a).
56. Id. § 6-103 comment.
57. Id. § 6-103 (b).
58. Id. § 6-103 (c).
59. 487 S.W.2d at 499.
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OVERBREADTH AND VAGUENESS-KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI,
REVISED ORDINANCE SECTION 26.10(c) (1967)
Kansas City v. Thorpe'
During the first two weeks of September, 1970, there were many fights
between groups of black and white students in the vicinity of East High
School in Kansas City. The Kansas City police attempted to prevent young
people from congregating. At 3:30 p.m. on September 18 approximately 150
whites and 25 to 40 blacks gathered in separate groups approximately one
block apart. When police arrested five students a crowd formed around
them. Officers placed the arrested students in a paddy wagon and directed
the group to move on. When they refused to disperse, Officer Baker specif-
ically requested a young girl to move on and arrested her when she failed
to do so. While the officer attempted to place the girl in a patrol car,
defendant Thorpe came to within six to eight inches of him and repeatedly
claimed the girl had done nothing and could not be arrested. The officer
ordered defendant to move on; when he failed to do so and continued his
assertions he was arrested. Meanwhile, the girl escaped. At the time of the
arrest, 25 to 40 people remained assembled about the parties.
Defendant was charged with a violation of Kansas City, Missouri,
Revised Ordinance section 26.10(c) (1967), which provides:
Any person who, with intent to cause a breach of the peace or
whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned, commits any
of the following acts shall be deemed to have committed the offense
of disorderly conduct: . . .Congregates with others on a public
street and refuses to move on when ordered by the police. 2
Defendant was convicted and fined twenty dollars.3
On appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court, defendant contended that
the ordinance was unconstitutional as vague and overbroad under the due
process clause of the 14th amendment of the United States Constitution
and section 10 of article I of the Missouri Constitution.4 The Missouri
Supreme Court ruled that the ordinance was valid.5
A statute is overbroad if it prohibits activity protected by the constitu-
tion as well as unprotected activity.6 The overbreadth test has only been
applied to invalidate statutes which forbid activities protected under
the first amendment, like free speech or assembly. These rights are
protected from invasion by the states through the due process clause of the
14th amendment.7
1. 499 S.W.2d 454 (Mo. 1973).
2. Defendant was charged with violation of the ordinance "with intent to
provoke a breach of the peace." Id. at 459.
8. Id. at 456.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 460 (Morgan, J., not participating).
6. United States v. Robel, 889 U.S. 258, 266 (1967).
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Vagueness is a separate concept which requires that a statute be
sufficiently explicit to inform possible offenders of what conduct is
prohibited. 8 The standard applied is that of a man of common intelligence.
If such a man must guess at the statutes meaning, or if men of common
intelligence may reasonably differ as to its application, the statute violates
the due process clause9 of the 5th10 or 14th" amendments, which require fair
notice of prohibited conduct. 2 In addition to "fair notice", statutes must
contain reasonable guidelines to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory en-
forcement.'3 The language should be sufficiently specific to limit the
discretion exercisable by police, judges, or juries.14
Ordinarily, a defendant has standing to challenge a statute15 only if his
conduct was constitutionally protected;:' thus, the statute would be invalid
"as applied" to him." In the first amendment area,', however, the defen-
dant can challenge a statute as void on its face' 9 even if his conduct is
unprotected and could have been prohibited by a properly drawn law.20
This departure from normal standing requirements is justified by the im-
portance of first amendment rights and the "chilling" effect on those rights
of overbroad or vague statutes.21 A "chilling" effect is one that restrains
people from exercising their constitutional rights, particularly in the area
of freedom of expression.22 "[S] tandards of permissible statutory vagueness
[and overbreadth] are strict in the area of free expression .... [G] overn-
ment may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity."23
8. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 885, 391 (1926). Statutes need
not be meticulously specific, but only as explicit as is reasonably possible. Grayned
v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972).
9. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 885, 391 (1926).
10. Screws v. United States, 825 U.S. 91 (1945).
11. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 806 U.S. 451 (1939).
12. The proper interpretation of a statute is a question for the courts. In
re H- S-, 286 Mo. App. 1296, 1301, 165 S.W.2d 300, 302 (St. L. Ct. App.
1942). Thus, a statute or ordinance that is vague or overbroad on its face can be
cured by court construction limiting its application. Similarly, a statute that
facially appears constitutional can become overbroad or vague through court
construction. Poulos v. New Hampshire, 845 U.S. 895 (1953). Federal courts are,
of course, bound by constructions given state laws by state courts. Snyder v. State-
Wide Properties, Inc., 311 F.2d 83, 35 (7th Cir. 1962).
13. Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
14. Id. at 108-10.
15. See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 Harv. L. Rev.
844 (1970).
16. Barrows v. Jackson, 846 U.S. 249, 255 (1958).
17. Note, supra note 15, at 846. This is to be distinguished from the uncon-
stitutional execution of an otherwise valid statute by police and the courts, some-
times also referred to as overbroad as applied.
18. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-21 (1972).
19. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 98 (1940).
20. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972); Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500, 516-17 (1964).
21. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972); Dombrowski v. Pfister,
880 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
22. Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 807, 844-45 (1967) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
28. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 871 U.S. 415, 432-83 (1968); accord, Scull v.
Virginia, 379 U.S. 344 (1959).
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In Thorpe, the court found that breach of the peace in Missouri was
restricted to "acts or conduct inciting violence or intended to provoke others
to violence."24 This distinguishes Thorpe from Cox v. Louisiana,5 in which
a similar statute was struck down. The Louisiana court had defined 2
breach of the peace as "to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest,
to interrupt, to hinder, [or] to disquiet."27 This definition was overbroad
because it included speech protected by the first amendment, which might
often "agitate" or "disquiet" the listener.28
24. 499 S.W.2d at 458.
25. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
26. Disorderly conduct was not an offense at common law. State v. Reynolds,
243 Minn. 196, 201, 66 N.W.2d 886, 890 (1954); State v. Labato, 7 N.J. 187,
150, 80 A.2d 617, 623 (1951). Thus, its definition is based solely on the statute
in question and court constructions thereof. State v. Reynolds, supra at 201-02, 66
N.W.2d at 890.
27. 879 U.S. 536, 551 (1965). LA. BEv. STAT. § 14:103.1 (Supp. 1974)
provides:
Whoever with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or under circum-
stances such that a breach of the peace may be occasioned thereby...
congregates with others.., upon.., a public street... and... refuses
to... move... when ordered so to do by any law enforcement officer
'. . shall be guilty of disturbing the peace.
Reverend Elton Cox led a demonstration of 2,000 students in a march to the
Baton Rouge courthouse. The Chief of Police instructed Cox to confine his
followers to the west side of the street. After a short program, Cox announced
that they would begin sitting at lunch counters. A nearby crowd of 100 to 300
curious whites began to mutter and grumble. Seventy-five policemen were present,
but the sheriff ordered the demonstrators to disperse because they were disturbing
the peace. When they failed to obey they were tear-gassed; Cox was arrested the
following day (Cox v. Louisiana, 879 U.S. 536, 539-44 (1965)) and subsequently
convicted for breach of the peace. Id. at 554. The Supreme Court, invalidating
the conviction, said that the Louisiana court's definition "would allow persons to
be punished merely for peacefully expressing unpopular views." Id. at 551(emphasis added).
Infringement of first amendment rights by statutory uncertainty was first
recognized in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). Newton Cantwell,
a Jehovah's Witness, stopped two men on a street and received their permission
to play a record for them. The record attacked the Roman Catholic religion; since
both men were Catholic they became angered and ordered Cantwell to leave.
Both were tempted to strike him if he remained, but fortunately he left. Cantwell
was later arrested and charged with inciting others to breach the peace. Id. at
800, 302-03. His conviction was overturned because the statute was of "a general
and indefinite characterization... leaving to the executive and judicial branches
too wide a discretion in its application." Id. at 308.
28. The Court cited Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949):
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite
dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a con-
dition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or
even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging.
It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound un-
settling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea.
Id. at4.
In Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972), defendant was in a group which
picketed an Army headquarters building. A scuffle ensued, during which defendant
uttered profanity toward two officers. He was charged with use of opprobrious
1974]
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Thorpe relied on St. Louis v. Slupsky,29 which upheld an ordinance that
prohibited a very broad range of conduct.30 The court in Slupsky limited
the ordinance by holding that, unless otherwise provided, "language31 will
not constitute a breach of the peace ... unless ... [it] tend[s] to excite
immediate violence . .. "32 Even this definition may be too broad today.
Speech which, although not intended to do so, has a tendency to incite
violence has normally been punishable only in two cases, where the language
falls within the concept of "fighting words" or where "hostile audiences"
are involved.33 "Fighting words" are "those personally abusive epithets
which . . . are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to
provoke violent reaction."3 4 A "hostile audience" is likely to be involved
when the speaker's words have agitated his audience to the point that there
is an imminent danger of violence, which the police present cannot control.3 5
words or abusive langage tending to cause a breach of the peace. Id. at 519-20
n.1. The statute was held to be vague and overbroad because Georgia courts had
construed it to include any offensive conduct. Id. at 520, 527.
Missouri courts have never defined breach of the peace to include non-
violent acts. But cf. St. Louis v. Goldman, 467 S.W.2d 99 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1040 (1972). Defendant was convicted of disturbing the
peace by disorderly conduct in a public place. Her conduct consisted of hand-
cuffing herself to a department store door and remaining mute while a crowd
gathered. The court, affirming the conviction, stated: "Missouri courts have not
specifically defined 'disturbing the peace'." Id. at 102. Although the courts some-
times use disturbing the peace and breach of the peace interchangeably, the
former is a broader term including conduct that falls short of incitement to
violence.
29. 254 Mo. 309, 162 S.W. 155 (1918). Slupsky conducted a loud and
profane tirade toward a young girl and her family over a common backyard fence.
His speech would probably be considered "fighting words" today. See text accom-
panying notes 32-84 infra.
80. ST. Louis, Missoumi, ORn. § 1537 (1907) provides:
Any person who .. .shall disturb the peace of others by ... loud and
unusual noises, or by unseemly, profane, obscene or offensive language,
calculated to provoke a breach of the peace . .. shall be deemed guilty
of [disturbance of the peace] ....
31. Thorpe extends this construction to "acts or conduct." 499 S.W.2d at 458.
32. St. Louis v. Slupsky, 254 Mo. 309, 318, 162 S.W. 155, 157 (1918)
(emphasis added). One basis for the court's conclusion was that the statute usedthe word "provoke" in referring to breach of the peace. This indicated to the
court some sort of physical encounter. Id. The Kansas City ordinance in Thorpe
also uses this term. The Slupsky definition has been cited in other Missouri deci-
sions, Louisiana v. Bottoms, 800 S.W. 816 (St. L. Mo. App. 1927); Plattsburg v.
Smarr, 216 S.W. 538 (K.C. Mo. App. 1919), and never criticized. Further, all
breach of the peace convictions in Missouri seem to have involved violence or
threats of violence. Slupsky, Plattsburg & Bottoms, supra; Taaffe v. Kyne, 9 Mo.
App. 15, 17 (St. L. Ct. App. 1880). See State v. Brothers, 445 S.W.2d 808
(1969); Martin v. Martin, 160 S.W.2d 457 (St. L. Mo. App. 1942).
88. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 815 U.S. 568 (1942) (the first
definition of "fighting words"); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 815 (1951)
("hostile audience").
34. See also Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Cohen v. California,
408 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
85. Feiner v. New York, 840 U.S. 815, 319-21 (1951). Arguably, the police
must first request the speaker to desist and warn him of arrest if he continues.
Id. They must protect his right to speak if they can. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana,
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Unless covered by one of these categories, mere resulting violence arguably
does not make the causative act punishable, and hence a statute that pro-
scribes such acts may be overbroad.38
In Thorpe the defendant was convicted under the "intent provision
of the statute; thus, it was not necessary to find "fighting words" or a
"hostile audience." 7 Intentional incitement of violence is not a protected
function of free expression, and the state's power to prevent it is generally
accepted.38 This is because the function of free speech is communication of
ideas; it is communication that the first amendment protects. In Colten v.
Kentucky39 the Court found that defendant's actions "appear[ed] to have
had no purpose other than to cause inconvenience and annoyance,"40 and
thus his activity was not constitutionally protected.41 Similarly, intentional
incitement of violence has no communicative purpose and can be prohibited.
The supreme court found that the element of intent could be inferred
from the circumstances surrounding the arrest, stating that any "sane
person" would have expected violence to result from the defendant's act.42
The judge, therefore, could properly infer that defendant intended that
consequence.43 If the defendant intended violence to occur and continued his
conduct he was exercising no constitutionally protected freedom. 44
The Missouri Supreme Court dismissed the "vagueness" contention
summarily, stating that the ordinance "conveys a sufficiently defined warning
• . . when measured by common understanding . . ..45 Thorpe's under-
86. The provision of the Kansas City ordinance which prohibits activity
whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned" could be constitutionally
defective even though limited to speech which tends to incite immediate violence.
The provision should be limited to cases involving "fighting words" and "hostile
audiences," or by the standard of a reasonable man-would a reasonable man
have expected violence to result-otherwise, the statute would prohibit activity
encompassed by the first amendment and punish one who has no criminal intent.
It would thus create absolute liability. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320
U.S. 277 (1943). Further, under procedural notions of due process, the statute
would not give "fair notice" of prohibited conduct. Due process may require that
the actor at least negligently miscalculate the likelihood of violence. See Lambert
v. California, 855 U.S. 225 (1957).
37. See statute quoted at note 2 supra.
38. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940). See Note, Public
Disorder Statutes in Iowa: An Evaluation of Existing Statutes and the Proposed
Revisions, 57 IowA L. RFv. 862, 880-81 (1972).
89. 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
40. Id. at 109. Colten and friends stopped their cars on the roadside to
protest the issuance of a ticket to one of their group. Colten was convicted of
disorderly conduct for congregating with others and refusing to disperse. Colten
claimed his actions were protected by the free speech and freedom of assembly
provisions. The court held that his activity was not protected by the first amend-
ment and that "[hIe had no constitutional right to observe the issuance of a
traffic ticket or to engage the issuing officer in conversation at that time." Id.
41. Id.
42. 499 S.W.2d at 459.
43. Id. The case was tried without a jury.
44. Id. See text accompanying notes 87-41 supra.
45. 499 S.W.2d at 456.
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standing of the statute is irrelevant because he is held to the standard of
a reasonable man.46
Thorpe establishes a state-wide standard for future breach of the peace
and disorderly conduct cases. The standard is that breach of the peace
covers only actions which tend to incite violence or intended to provoke
violence. Although the prohibition of all actions which merely incite violence
may be questionable, 47 law enforcement officials are put on notice that
existing ordinances may be overly broad48 if they are not limited in accor-
dance with Thorpe. It is submitted that the court is correct in concluding
that the 1st and 14th amendments do not protect speech or conduct used
to incite violent reactions.
BcARxw D. WooDs
46. A lower federal court has held that a Memphis, Tennessee, ordinance
worded almost exactly as the Kansas City ordinance is both vague and overbroad
on its face. No mention was made of any state court constructions of the ordinance.
Kirkwood v. Loeb, 828 F. Supp. 611 (W.D. Tenn. 1971). MuMTps, TENN.,
CITY CODE § 22-12(3) provides:
Any person, who with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or where-
by a breach of the peace may be occasioned, commits any of the follow-
ing acts shall be deemed to have committed the offense of disorderly
conduct . . . Congregates with others on a street, and refuses to move
on when ordered by the police.
The court held:
Subsection . . . 3 . . . of the disorderly conduct ordinance [is]
conditioned upon the failure to "move" when directed to do so by a
policeman and include[s] standards which are vague and overbroad.
Therefore, by [its] very terms [this] subsection . . . make[s] an indi-
viduals continued presence on a public street conditioned upon the
permission of a policeman.
Id. at 616. Dicta in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), stated that a pro-
vision proscribing a refusal to move on after being ordered to by a law enforce-
ment officer "is narrow and specific." Id. at 551. DIscmcT oF CoLumriA, CODE§ 22-1121 (2) (1961), is similar to the Kansas City ordinance:
Whoever, with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or under cir-
cumstances such that a breach of the peace may be occasioned thereby
. . congregates with others on a public street and refuses to move on
when ordered by the police ... [shall be guilty of disorderly conduct.]
This ordinance was found not to be vague and indefinite in Scott v. District of
Columbia, 184 A.2d 849 (Mun. Ct. App. 1962). The court said:
The statute... does no more than give the police the right, within
reasonable limitations, to keep the public sidewalks free of unnecessary
obstructions and prevent groups from congregating in such a way that
a breach of peace may result.
Id. at 852. Two recent decisions of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
have reaffirmed Scott. Feeley v. District of Columbia, 220 A.2d 325 (Ct. App.
1966); Jalbert v. District of Columbia, 221 A.2d 94 (Ct. App. 1966).
47. See text accompanying notes 29-36 supra.
48. Recent Supreme Court decisions have indicated some dissatisfaction with
the overbreadth doctrine. Justice White registered dissatisfaction in his dissent in
Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971). The newer members of the Court
would apply the overbreadth doctrine only in "substantial" cases, if at all.
Cooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 530-32 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972) (Powell & Rehnquist, J.J., dis-
senting); Plummer v. Columbus, 94 S. Ct. 17 (1973) (Burger, C.J., Blackmun,
Powell ,& Rehnquist, J.J., dissenting). The dissenters apparently favor the "as
applied" approach. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
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SECURITIES REGULATION-DEFINITION OF A SECURITY-
PYRAMID PROMOTION AS AN INVESTMENT CONTRACT
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.'
Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., through its Dare to Be Great, Inc.,
subsidiary (Dare), offered a program of self-improvement courses coupled
with a pyramid sales feature.2 These programs, called "Adventures, '13 were
comprised of diverse sales instruction materials and revival-style meetings
where Dare speakers preached their technique. Participants in the higher-
priced programs could sell the "Adventures" to others and were led to expect
lucrative commissions on such sales. As business developed, stock options in
the promoting corporation were to become available to successful partic-
ipants. Although no guarantees were made, Dare speakers stressed that hard
work with the correct "philosophy" would inevitably bring success.
As "independent sales trainees," participants in the courses did no
more than bring prospects to the Dare meetings. There the speakers flaunted
cash, flashy clothes, and new automobiles to convince prospects of the
wealth to be won.4 The meetings were apparently spontaneous but were
1. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
2. A pyramid sales promotion is a plan in which participant investors
expect to make most or all of their returns by recruiting others to participate.
Typically, the participant pays the promoter a fee and must sell the plan to at
least two others to make a profit. Since pyramid promotions require geometric
expansion of the number of participants, market saturation and losses to the last
level of participants are inevitable. The SEC has therefore characterized pyramid
schemes as "inherently fraudulent." Securities Act Release No. 33-5211, Exchange
Act Release No. 9387, 36 Fed. Reg. 23289, 23291, CCH FED. SEc. L. lP.
[71-72 Transfer Binder] 78,446 at 80,976. The chain letter scheme is a pure
form of pyramid promotion. Other plans involve the sale of services, as in Turner,
or retail goods, as in SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, note 59 infra, but these benefits
are incident to the main opportunity to recruit others, and their price includes a
substantial overcharge representing the fee for entry into the plan.
3. The lessons were advertised as "Adventures" and "The Plan". Their
market value, if any, was far below the stated prices. Adventure I sold for $300.
It included a tape recorder, 12 taped lessons, written notebook material, and
12-16 hours of group sessions. Adventure II sold for $700 and contained 12 more
hours of taped lessons and 80 more hours of group sessions. Adventure III cost$2,000. It included Adventure II plus 6 additional hours of taped lessons, 30 hours
of group sessions, and extra written material. Furthermore, the purchaser could
become an "independent sales trainee" with the right to sell Adventures I, II, and
III with commissions of $100, $300, and $900 each, respectively. Adventure IV
cost $5,000. Besides 6 additional tapes, 80 more hours of group sessions, a movie
projector with 6 films, and the right to attend 2 other week-long seminars in
Florida, the purchaser received the right to sell Adventure IV for a $2,500 com-
mission. The $1,000 Plan included the taped instructional materials of Adventure
II and a 24-hour group session. If he could bring in two other purchasers, he
could sell the Plan for a $400 commisison on each additional sale. Procuring three
other purchasers would win him the right to sell the Plan without buying it him-
self. Only Adventures III and IV and the Plan were enjoined. 474 F.2d at 478.
4. Dare employees urged investors to go in debt, if necessary, to create the
illusion of affluence, saying "Fake it 'til you make it." 474 F.2d at 480.
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actually conducted according to a script. Participants were forbidden to
disclose the content of the meetings, in which the Dare personnel undertook
the main sales effort. Few participants recovered their initial outlay.
The Securities and Exchange Commission sought an injunction against
certain of Dare's activities as offerings of unregistered securities under the
Securities Act of 19335 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.6 The trial
court granted the injunction, finding that those programs offering returns
via resale commissions7 fell within three defined categories of securities
common to both statutes: "investment contract," "certificate of interest or
participation in a profit sharing plan," and "instrument commonly known as
a 'security'." Dare appealed, contending that for purposes of the federal
statute, a security exists only where the investor expects to receive profits
derived solely from the efforts of others.$ The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, however, held that Dare's scheme was an investment contract
within the coverage of the securities acts, and therefore was subject to
registration requirements.9
The Federal Acts of 1933 and 1934 were enacted to remedy abuses in
the financial markets thought to have contributed to the crash of 1929.
Their purpose is to ensure disclosure of relevant information to investors
and to prevent and punish misrepresentation in the sale of securities.'0 The
1933 act deals with initial offerings of securities to the public. It requires
the issuer to register the securities with the SEC by filing a statement
disclosing specified data and to furnish the buyer with a prospectus con-
taining the same basic information."' Some securities are exempt from
registration, but all offerings are subject to a general antifraud provision
5. Section 5 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970), requires registration
of nonexempt securities. Section 20, 15 U.S.C. § 77t, authorizes the SEC to
seek injunctions against the offering of such securities.
6. Section 12 (a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781(a), imposes a registra-
tion requirement, and § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u, authorizes the injunction remedy.
7. These were Adventures I and IV and the Plan, in which purchasers
expected to recover a profit from recruiting other purchasers.
8. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
9. 474 F.2d at 482.
10. See 1 L. Loss, SEcrmums REcuLr.oN 107-58 (2d ed. 1961). The acts
do not purport to regulate regarding the soundness of investments. In his message
of March 29, 1938, President Roosevelt stated:
Of course, the Federal Government cannot and should not take any
action which might be construed as approving or guaranteeing that
newly issued securities are sound in the sense that their value will be
maintained or that the properties which they represent will earn profit.
There is, however, an obligation upon us to insist that every issue
of new securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied
by full publicity and information, and that no essentially important
element attending the issue shall be concealed from the buying public.
This proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor, the further
doctrine '"et the seller also beware."
H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
11. See 1 L. Loss, SEcumunEs REGULATION 130 (2d ed. 1961). For the legis-
lative history of the 1938 Act see S. Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1933),
and H.R. Doc. No. 122, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1988). See also Landis, The
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with civil and criminal remedies. The 1934 Securities and Exchange Act
extends similar requirements to post-distribution trading in securities on
stock exchanges.12
In drafting these laws, Congress was impressed with the need for an
inclusive definition of security. Imaginative entreprenuers might quickly
render obsolete a definition-limited to traditional forms of securities.' 3 The
definitional sections of both acts open with lists of recognized forms of
securities,14 and conclude with several catchall categories.'- Courts have
frequently stated that these catchall definitions should remain vague to
preclude giving a "guidepost to wrongdoers, ' 6 and to provide investor pro-
tection.1'7 They emphasize the reality of the transaction and give short shrift
12. See H.R. Rep. No. 1888, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1934). See also
Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of 1984 and the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940, 28 GEo. WAS. L. REv. 214 (1959).
18. SEC v. Crude Oil Corp., 98 F.2d 844 (7th Cir. 1987).
Section 2(1) followed the enactment of what has generally been called
the Blue Sky laws of the various states, and the ingenuity and fertility
of those dealers in securities who deliberately attempted to avoid their
application supplied the experience against which this legislation was
written.
Id. at 847.
14. Section 2(1) of the 1938 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970), defines
"secunt" as:
[a]ny note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebted-
ness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agree-
ment, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or sub-
scription, transferable share, investment contract, voting trust certificate,
certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil,
gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a "security", or any certificate of interest or partici-
pation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of,
or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
Section 8(a)(10) of the 1984 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1973), defines
"security" as:
[a]ny note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil,
gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, or in
general, any instrument commonly known as a 'security"; or any certifi-
cate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for,
receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to any purchase, any of the
foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of
exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of
issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or
any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
15. See Long, Partnership, Limited Partnership, and Joint Venture Interests
as Securities, 37 Mo. L. REv. 581, 596 (1972), and 1 Loss, SEcUrmrEs REGULA-
TnoN 488 (2d ed. 1961). See also § 409.401(1), RSMo 1969, the Missouri Uniform
Securities Act, adopted in 1967. For an example of a Blue Sky statutory definition
section antedating the federal statutes see ILL. REV. STAT. Cb. 82, %255 (Cahill
1981).
16. Commonwealth v. Consumers Research Consultants, 199 A.2d 428, 429
(Pa. 1964). See Annot., 168 A.L.R. 1050, 1053 (1946).
17. "The statutory purpose of affording broad protection to investors is not
to be thwarted by unrealistic and irrelevant formulae." SEC v. W.J. Howey, Inc.,
828 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
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to the terms the parties use.'8 Thus, stock in a cooperative residential apart-
ment, while within the wording of the definitions, is not a security.19 Frac-
tional undivided interests in income producing realty sold to nonresidents on
a lease-back arrangement, however, have been held to be securities.1°
In defining securities under these catchall phrases, state and federal
courts have frequently borrowed from each other. For example, federal
courts have looked to pre-1933 state cases for definition of "investment con-
tract,"2 ' and the Turner court indicated that "instrument commonly known
as a security" (a term which has not been developed in the cases) might
encompass evolving state court definitions of a security.22 State courts
have reciprocated and followed federal tests for investment contracts.23 The
18. SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 887 U.S. 202, 211 (1967); SEC v.
C.M. Joiner Leasing Co., 820 U.S. 344, 852-53 (1948); State v. Gopher Tire &
Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 56, 177 N.W. 987, 938 (1920).
19. Polikoff v. Levy, 55 IMI. App. 2d 229, 204 N.E.2d 807, cert. denied, 382
U.S. 903 (1965); State v. Silberberg, 166 Ohio St. 101, 139 N.E.2d 342 (1956).
20. Sire Plan Portfolios v. Carpentier, 8 Ill. App. 2d 854, 132 N.E.2d 78(Ill. 1956). See L. Loss, note 10 supra, at 492-95.
21. Id. at 298. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 828 U.S. 298 (1946).
By including an investment contract within the scope of § 2(1) of
the 1933 Securities Act the Congress was using a term the meaning of
which had been crystallized by this prior judicial interpretation. It is
therefore reasonable to attach that meaning to the term as used by
Congress ....
See note 4 of the Court's opinion for the state cases relied on; see also Long, An
Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities Regula-
tion, 24 OCLA. L. REv. 135, 146 (1971), for analysis of the extent to which those
cases actually support the test for investment contract formulated by Justice
Murphy in the Howey opinion.
The phrase "investment contract" was first drafted in an Arkansas statute
regulating building and loan companies. Aim. AcTs. § 18 (1918). The Minnesota
Blue Sky Law of 1917 contained the first use of the term in a statutory definition
of a security. Mnii. GEN. LAw ch. 429, § 3 (1917). Use of the term became
general after its inclusion in the definitional section of a 1927 draft of the Uniform
Securities Sales Act, and it now appears in 30 Blue Sky statutes. See Coleman, A
Franchise Agreement: Not a "Security" Under the Securities Act of 1933, 22
Bus. LAwaR 493 (1967).
22. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 766, 773 (D. Oregon 1972),
citing the California "risk capital" test of Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski,
55 Cal. 2d 811, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186, 361 P.2d 906 (1961). See text accompanying
notes 55-58 infra. For a state case construing the category "any instrument com-
monly known as a security" in a blue sky statute see First Nat'l. Savings Founda-
tion, Inc. v. Samp, 274 Wis. 118, 129, 80 N.W.2d 249, 256 (1956).
23. State court cases cited note 45 infra.
The other major definitional category, profit-sharing plans, has generally
been formed on the same facts as investment contracts. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner,
Inc., 348 F. Supp. 766, 776 (D. Ore. 1972); SEC v. Addison, 194 F.Supp. 709(N.D. Tex. 1961); SEC v. Payne, 85 F.Supp. 873 ,S.D.N.Y. 1940). Some
courts have imposed an additional requirement that the "investor receive a fixed
share of profits. See SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., No. 17134, CCH FED.
SEc. L. REp. 93,960 (N.D. Ga. 1973). The various categories of the definitional
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issue in Turner was whether the "Adventures" were securities and thus
enjoinable as unregistered offerings.
Investment contract securities have been found under various financing
schemes.24 Sales of income-producing orchard real estate, 25 fractional
assignments of mineral leases, 26 whiskey warehouse receipts,2 7 agreements
for resale of merchandise for inactive "distributors", 28 contracts for the sale
and care of fur-bearing animals,29 promissory notes secured by deeds of
trust,30 insurance annuity contracts,2 1 coin collection investment programs, 2
franchises,33 and even subscriptions for shares in the proceeds of an estate
contest litigation 4 have been found to be investment contracts. Efforts to
obscure the nature of a transaction by tying it to sales or tangible property
interests35 or by dispersing it among a series of agreements between related
entities36 have failed to avoid this result.
24. See Annot., 3 A.L.R. Fed. 592 (1970).
25. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); Blackwell v. Bentsen,
203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. dismissed 847 U.S. 925 (1954); SEC v.
Orange Grove Tracts, 210 F. Supp. 81 (D. Mass. 1962); SEC v. Tung Corp., 32
F. Supp. 371 (N.D. Il1. 1940).
26. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943); Johns Hopkins
Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970); SEC v. MacElvain, 417 F.2d
1134 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 972 (1970); United States v. Herr,
338 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 999, reh. denied, 383 U.S.
922 (1966); United States v. Wernes, 157 F.2d 797, (7th Cir. 1946).
27. United States v. Vidaver, 73 F. Supp. 382, (E.D. Va. 1947); Penfield
Co. of California v. SEC, 143 F.2d 746 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 768
(1944); SEC v. Bourbon Sales Corp., 47 F. Supp. 70 (W.D. Ky. 1942).
28. United States v. Herr, 338 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 999, reh. denied, 383 U.S. 922 (1966).
29. Kemmerer v. Weaver, 445 F.2d 76 (7th Cir. 1971) (beavers); Conti-
nental Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 905 (1968) (beaver); SEC v. Payne, 35 F. Supp. 873, 2 S.E.C. Jud.
Dec. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (silver foxes).
30. Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162 (9th
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961). Defendant sellers offered their
facilities in selecting the mortgaged properties, servicing the notes, and collecting
payments and making foreclosures.
31. SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967).
32. SEC v. Comstock Coin Co., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 91,414 (D. Nev. 1964).
33. Huberman v. Denny's Restaurants, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Cal.
1972) (plaintiff lessee bought lease and franchisee corporation upon lessor's
promise to operate the business); In re Tucker Corp., 26 S.E.C. 249, [1945-1947
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 75,802 (1947) (automobile dealership
and distributorship franchise agreements providing for future repayment of fran-
chise purchase proceeds).
34. SEC v. Latta, 250 F. Supp. 170, (N.D. Cal. 1965), affd, 856 F.2d 103
(9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 940 (1966).
35. The cases cited in notes 24-32 involved purported sales of property
linked to management agreements whereby the promoter or a third party under
his influence would retain management control of the property and be respon-
sible for generating income. See 1 Loss, SEcunlu=s REGULATION 489-90 (2d
ed. 1961).
36. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), where orchard
management services were provided by a service corporation controlled by the
seller. See also Continental Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir.
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Yet, courts37 and commentators38 have criticized the law's failure to deal
effectively with novel forms of financing such as franchising, founder-mem-
ber distributorships, and pyramid sales schemes. Although such devices
are tied to retail marketing and are not associated with the basic notion of
securities instruments,3 9 they are popular with shoestring operators who
solicit the less educated members of the community.
The majority definition of investment contract derives from two land-
mark Supreme Court decisions. In SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,40
an oil prospector obtained assignments of mineral leases on 3,000 acres of
land and undertook to finance his drilling by a widely advertised campaign
of reassignment sales in lots of two to five acres. These portions were too
small for economical drilling by individual lessors, so the prospector
proposed to drill for them. The Court upheld an injunction against the sales
and noted that without the common drilling enterprise, the leaseholds would
have little value. Instead of stating a rule, however, the Court said that the
defendants' enterprise had colored the leasehold transactions with "all the
evils inherent in the securities transactions which it was the aim of the
Securities Act to end."41
Three years later in SEC v. W.I. Howey Co. 42 the Court struck down a
similar scheme for the cultivation of orange groves.43 The Court held that
an investment contract exists wherever "the scheme involves an investment
of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the
efforts of others."44 The Court established what makes a particular invest-
1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 905 (1968). But see Belhumeur v. Dawson, 229
F. Supp. 78 (D. Mont. 1964), where a division of the parties into different
legal entities was held to negate the common enterprise element of the Howey
test, set forth in text accompanying notes 45-47 infra.
37. State ex rel. Commr of Securities v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52
Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
38. Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Mean-
ingful Formula?, 18 W. REs. L. REV. 367 (1967); Long, An Attempt to Return
"Investment Contracts to the Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24 OxLA. L.
REV. 185, 160 (1971).
89. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. %93,960.
40. 820 U.S. 344 (1943).
41. Id. at 349.
42. 828 U.S. 293 (1946).
48. Investors purchased the fee in small parcels averaging 1.83 acres of
citrus grove land, then leased them back to a service corporation with authority
to cultivate and market the crop. The individual parcels were thus too small for
profitable cultivation.
44. 328 U.S. at 801 (emphasis added). The problem was to provide ade-
quate, flexible protection to the investing public in the face of constantly evolving
modes of enterprise financing while maintaining some integrity for the concept of
a security and thus a limit on the scope of relief. Presumably, Congress did not
intend to make the liberal remedies of the securities acts available to plaintiffs
in all business transactions to the exclusion of regular statutory and common law
remedies for fraud. H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 11. Securities must
be distinguished from ordinary sales and employment contracts. Offerors may
characterize the transaction as a sale by insisting on the passing of property rights
with some inherent value independent of the success or failure of the venture.
The Howey Court looked to two factors to overcome this reasoning: the investors'
expectation of gain and their reliance on the efforts and skill of others to procure
it. Although the law ordinarily will not remake a bad bargain for the parties, the
[Vol. 39
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ment agreement an investment contract: (1) a common enterprise; (2) an
expectation of profits; and (3) reliance (by the investor) solely on the efforts
of others.45
The Howey three-element test of investment contract has proven popu-
lar with state and federal courts.40 These courts have refused to find a
security "where neither the element of a common enterprise nor the element
of reliance on the efforts of another is present,"47 thus adopting reasonable
limits on the scope of securities regulation.
Yet difficulties persist even where all three elements are present.
Common enterprise as an element is vague. Emphasis on expected profits
may slight the importance of the initial investment risk, especially where the
investor receives nonmaterial benefits.48 Most disputes, however, have
involved the third element: Is the requirement of reliance solely on the
efforts of others to be read literally? The issue is whether the investor's
activity is consistent with a security transaction.49 A strict interpretation of
the requirement would apparently preclude finding a security if the investor
participated to an appreciable extent in the common enterprise.
In Turner the defense urged a strict view of this third element, as
linkage of an excessive overcharge to the buyers' expectation of gain through the
enterprise of the promoter presents a different case from the mere sale of prop-
erty. The purchasers from Howey expected to profit from their participation with-
out assuming any responsibilities. The consideration for their investment was a
promise of a return from Howeys future cultivation of their land, as well as the
property itself. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299-300.
45. Id. at 298-99.
46. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 889 U.S. 832 (1967), rev'g 371 F.2d 374 (7th Cir.
1967); United States v. Herr, 338 F.2d 607, 609-10 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 999 (1966), reh. denied, 883 U.S. 922 (1966); Roe v. United States,
287 F.2d 435, 438 (5th Cir. 1961); Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203 F.2d 690, 693
(5th Cir. 1953), cert. dismissed, 347 U.S. 925 (1954); SEC v. Orange Grove
Tracts, 210 F. Supp. 81, 83 (D. Mass. 1962); Commonwealth ex rel. Pa. Sec.
Comm'n v. Consumers Research Consultants, 414 Pa. 253, 199 A.2d 428 (1964);
Emery v. So-Soft, Inc., 199 N.E.2d 120, 123 (Ohio Ct. App. 1964); Bruner v.
State, 463 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970). Contra, State ex rel. Commr of
Securities v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971) (Howey
test too narrow).
47. 1 L. Loss, SEcu.RrIs REGULATION 491 (2d ed. 1961). The other ele-
ment, hope of profits, is present in all investment transactions.
48. Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186,
361 P.2d 906 (1961), is the leading case standing for the proposition that a
security may exist where the benefits that the investor expects to receive are non-
material, rather than a cash return. The investors in Sobieski expected to be able
to use the facilities of a proposed commercial country club. The case also estab-
lished the first risk capital rule in a state jurisdiction, as discussed in note 55
infra.49.
[T]he assignment of nominal or limited responsibilities to the participant
does not negative the existence of an investment contract; where the
duties assigned are so narrowly circumscribed as to involve little real
choice of action or where the duties assigned would in any event have
little direct effect upon receipt by the participant of the benefits prom-
ised by the promoters, a security may be found to exist.
Securities Act Release No. 5211, Exchange Act Release No. 9387, 36 Fed. Reg.
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adopted in several state cases involving pyramid promotions.50 In these
cases investors had had the burden of soliciting other participants. Yet even
where their efforts were limited to referral and the sales pitch was left
entirely to the promoter, no investment contracts were found because "if
the party executing such agreement does nothing... he receives nothing."51
Likewise, argued Turner, the Dare sales trainees were active to the extent
of contacting new prospects and persuading them to come to meetings.
These labors, though insignificant, were necessary to an investor's success, so
the investor did not rely solely on the efforts of Dare personnel.
The Turner court rejected the strict Howey test as a defense. The
efforts of Dare purchasers, no matter how great, became irrelevant at the
point when Dare permitted saturation of an area. Withholding of this infor-
mation from the purchasers was essential to Dares continued operation.5 2
The promoters could not, the court reasoned, be allowed to shield their
activities by having purchasers perform insignificant functions. Thus, the
court held that investors who rely on essential managerial efforts of others
require the protection of disclosure under the Securities Acts. 53 Turner thus
represents a broadening of the third element of the Howey test to include
transactions in which investors do participate in the common enterprise, yet
rely essentially on the managerial acumen of the enterprise promoters for
a successful return.54
Recent state court cases have broadened the test of investment contract,
also. Following the lead of a California case,55 some states have adopted a
50. Gallon v. Alabama Mkt. Centers, Inc., 282 Ala. 679, 213 So. 2d 841(1968); Georgia Mkt. Centers, Inc. v. Fortson, 225 Ga. 854, 171 S.E.2d 620
1969); Fidelity Credit Co. v. Bradford, 177 So. 2d 635 (La. Ct. App. 1965);
Emery v. So-Soft of Ohio, Inc., 199 N.E.2d 120 (Ohio Ct. App. 1964); Common-
wealth ex rel. Pa. See. Comm'n v. Consumers Research Consultants, 414 Pa. 253,
199 N.E.2d 428 (1964); Bruner v. State, 463 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Crim. App.
1970), Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. v. King, 452 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App.
1970). These cases dealt with multilevel distributorships and pyramid plans sub-
stantially similar to those in Turner. They stand for the proposition that an invest-
ment contract exists only where the work performed by investors is token or
nonexistent.
51. Emery v. So-Soft of Ohio, Inc., 199 N.E.2d 120, 125 (Ohio Ct. App.
1964).
52. 474 F.2d 476, 479 (9th Cir. 1973).
53. Id. at 482.
54. The language of Howey hardly suggested a rigid test of the "solely"
element. Besides warning against mechanical application of "irrelevant formulae",
the Court indicated that the "efforts of others' to which it referred in the test
were managerial efforts which were essential to the investors' anticipated return.
Such tracts gain utility... only when cultivated.., as component
parts of a larger area. A common enterprise managed by respondents or
third parties with adequate personnel and equipment is therefore
essential ....
.... The investors provide the capital and share in the earnings and
profits; the promoters manage, control and operate the enterprise.
328 U.S. at 300 emphasis added).
55. Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186,
361 P.2d 906 (1961). In Silver Hills, developers of a commercial country club
sold memberships with authorization to use the proceeds of the sale to help
finance the construction of club facilities. The participants' expectation of using
the club was held to be a nonmaterial, beneficial interest in the venture, and the
[Vol. 39
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"risk capitar' approach,5 6 finding that an investment contract or other form
of security exists where the investor's money is subjected to risk in an enter-
prise over which the individual investor exercises no managerial control."
risk to which this interest was subjected through the uncertainties of the enter-
prise was held to be a sufficient ground for application of securities regulation.
56. D.M.C. of Colorado, Inc. v. Hays, [1954-1971 Transfer Binder] 3 BLruE
SKY L. REP. 70,897 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1971); Bond v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,
246 So. 2d 631 (Fla. App. 1971); Florida Discount Centers, Inc. v. Antinori, 226
So. 2d 693 (Fla. App. 1969), affd, 232 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1970); State ex rel.
Fisher v. World Mkt. Center, 3 BLUE SKY L. PEP. 71,034 (Okla. Dist. Ct. 1972);
State ex rel. Healy v. Consumer Business Systems, Inc., 5 Ore. App. 19, 482
P.2d 549 (1971); See State ex rel. Park v. Glenn Turner Enterprises, Inc., 8 BLUE
SKY L. Rt:P. 71,023 (4th Dist. Ct. Idaho 1972), where the Idaho court expands
the risk capital test to include offerings to raise capital for a continuing business
as well as for initial capital. The court also adverted to the "two-tier" theory of
investment through a franchise, in which the investor's capital outlay is viewed
as going partly to his own business and partly to a common venture with the
franchisor in his national level enterprise over which the franchisee has no control.
Id. at 67,201. For discussion of the double investment theory, see Note, Franchise
Regulation Under the California Corporate Securities Law, 5 SAN DIEGo L. REv.
140 at 169-70 (1968); Note, Regulation of the Franchise as a Security, 19 J.
PuBLIc L. 105, 125-27 (1970). For a case adopting risk capital principles undei
federal law, although restricted to high-risk, speculative franchises, see Mr. Steak,
Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640 (D. Colo. 1970), affd, 460 F.2d
666 (10th Cir. 1972).
57. State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971),
illustrates the application of the risk capital analysis to facts similar to those in
Turner. The promotion was a founder-member purchasing agreement whereby
investors (who became eligible by purchasing a cookware set at an inflated price)
hoped to realize commissions by recruiting others and receiving override payments
on sales by salesmen they hired, by their recruits, and by their recruits' salesmens'
sales. Staff-run recruitment meetings were the chief source of new investors. The
court read the profit-sharing clause of its statute broadly to cover these investors
who relied on commissions. Recognizing that the quality of an investor's participa-
tion is more important than the intensity of his work, it disapproved the cases
holding that a minor operational role for investors takes the case out of Howey.
Foreshadowing the test adopted in Turner, the Hawaii court held that "practical
and actual control over the managerial decisions of the enterprise" was the only
investor effort that would afford investors the necessary disclosure to avoid appli-
cation of the Blue Sky statute. Id. at 651-52, 485 P.2d at 111. The court adopted
a test drawn from Coffey's article, supra note 38:
[A]n investment contract is created whenever:
(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and
(2) a portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the enter-
prise, and
(3) the furnishing of initial value is induced by the offeror's promises
or representations which give rise to a reasonable understanding
that a valuable benefit of some kind, over and above the initial
value, will accrue to the offeree as a result of the operation of the
enterprise, and
(4) the offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and actual
control over the managerial decisions of the enterprise.
52 Hawaii at 649, 485 P.2d at 109, Compare the test proposed in Long, supra
note 38, at 174:
A security is the investment of money or money's worth in the risk capital
of a venture with the expectation of some benefit to the investor where
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These courts reason that no matter how active investors are, they have
limited access to information necessary to intelligent investment decision
making, and thus need the protection of the disclosure requirements and
liberal fraud remedies of the securities acts.58 The risk capital test may at
some point be incorporated into the federal acts as instruments "commonly
known as a security," as the lower court suggested in Turner.59 Although
Turner did not deal with the risk capital test directly, its essential managerial
efforts gloss on the Howey test results in a definition of investment contract
indistinguishable from the risk capital test.
The Turner view, however, is not universal, even at the federal level.
In SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,60 the SEC sought an injuncton against
a cosmetics distributor business that had survived attack under state legis-
lation."' Buyers paid the defendants a fee to become "distributors" and could
earn profits on retail sales by developing a sales organization of their own.
The chief inducement, however, was a commission on the recruitment of
of other distributors, as with Dare. The court recognized state risk capital
decisions as a trend in the law but refused to endorse that definition of an
instrument "commonly known" as a security. As to investment contracts, the
court viewed the essential managerial efforts test of Turner as a departure
from authority and, in any event, inapplicable because the efforts of Koscot
distributors were found to be substantial. 2
With increasing adoption of the risk capital test in state cases, federal
courts will be more likely to find that pyramid and multilevel franchise
schemes are commonly known as securities, even though they continue to
follow the strict Howey test of an investment contract. Because even in the
strict view promoters cannot avoid injunctions merely by requiring token
efforts by their investors,6 the issue is whether substantial yet nonmanagerial
investor efforts should preclude the finding of a security. In Turner, the
Ninth Circuit posed this issue through the hypothetical of a Howey-type
citrus grove promoter who has the buyers of his tracts plant the trees them-
selves before he begins cultivation.64 Such labor would be extensive and a
conditon precedent to earnings. Koscot treated substantial investor labors as
a manifestation of the common enterprise requirement; as such it did not
Coffey also argued that a security should be found where the investor has a
share of control but is not familiar with the business at the time he invests. The
Hawaii court ignored this element of his test. Its adoption would make the find-
ing of whether a security exists depend on whom a franchise was sold to, rather
than the terms of the offer.
58. See State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 646-47, 485 P.2d
105, 108 (1971).
59. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 766, 774 (D.C.
Ore. 1972).
60. CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 93,960 (N.D. Ga. 1978). Koscot Interplanetary
was another wholly-owned subsidiary of Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., and
hence featured a scheme similar to that of the principal case.
61. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. v. King, 452 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Civ. App.
1970).
62. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., CCH FED. SEc. L. REp. 98,960 at
98,846 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
63. Id.
64. 474 F.2d 476, 482-83 (9th Cir. 1973). See note 43 supra.
[Vol. 39
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negate the proposition that the investor had relied solely on the efforts of
others. The Turner court treated the investor effort in this hypothetical as
part of the consideration paid in, and thus did not preclude a finding that
the investors were relying solely on the efforts (managerial) of others.65
Such analytic separation of initial, nonmanagerial efforts from managerial
efforts may be justified in the hypothetical of the labor as part of the initial
value furnished and by the limited role of the investors in Turner.66 It may,
however, be harder to sustain in cases where investors assume a greater
degree of responsibility for continuing operations.
The vagueness of the Turner test may prove burdensome in the develop-
ment of securities rules for franchising. Its distinction of essential managerial
versus nondiscretionary investor efforts involves subjective judgments by
the trier of fact similar to the ministerial/discretionary rubric of administra-
tive law. Less abusive fact situations than that in Turner may not evoke
its rule.
Still, no black letter test can be created for this area; the various tests
can serve only as a checklist of policy concerns to which the courts must
refer in appraising novel schemes. The exclusion of Adventures I and II
from the security category because they offered no commissions for recruit-
ing other investors or overrides on sales made by other participants demon-
strates the limits of the Turner test. Howey has been too restrictively applied;
its expansion in Turner is warranted as an effort to preserve the effectiveness
of the federal securities acts.
HUGH R. LAW
TORT-SURVIVAL DAMAGES IN WRONGFUL DEATH
State ex rel. Smith v. Greene1
On September 30, 1970, John Galt was driving an explosives truck in
defiance of a strike called by Teamsters Union Local No. 823. A member
of the union, allegedly attempting only to disable the truck, fired on it and
detonated the 42,800 pound cargo. Galt was killed, and his clothing and
personal effects, valued at $100, were destroyed.2 Galt's administrator filed
a survival action against the union seeking personal property damages of
$100 and punitive damages of $80,000, alleging that since union officials
65. Id. at 482. The investor exchanges money, labor, and trees for a share
in what he hoped would be the company's success.
66. Long, supra note 88.
These courts [holding that the founder-membership contract is not an
investment contract] have failed to distinguish between labor performed
as a prerequisite to entitlement to receive the return on the investment(a partial investment by labor rather than money) and labor performed
in the generation of the actual return to be paid.
Id. at 162.
1. 494 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. En Bane 1973).
2. For a more detailed statement of the facts see the related criminal case
of State v. Shuler, 486 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. 1972).
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had ordered physical assaults on drivers who defied the strike, the member
had fired the shots as the union's agent.3 The union moved to strike the
punitive damages portion of the petition, and the trial court expressed its
intent to sustain the motion. The administrator then sought successfully
a writ of prohibition from the Missouri Supreme Court preserving the
punitive damage portion of the petition.
The union contended that any one of three Missouri statutes precluded
an administrator from recovering punitive damages for malicious destruction
of a decedents personal property. These three statutes are discussed below.
Missouri has allowed unlimited punitive damages in suits for personal
property damage. 4 When the damage is done maliciously, however, a
statuteu provides for a recovery of punitive damages equal to the value of
the property.6 Missouri courts had never before determined whether this
statute was the exclusive remedy in such cases, thereby precluding an award
of unlimited punitive damages at common law.? Greene held that since the
statute contained no language indicating that it was to be the exclusive
measure of damages or exclusive remedy, there was no clear legislative
intent to abrogate the common law right to punitive damages.8 This holding
accords with the Missouri view that punitive damages are awarded to
punish the wrongdoer,9 with the degree of culpability determining the
size of the award.'0 Under a different holding the wrongdoer would have
been punished at a fixed amount regardless of his culpability.
The court considered next the effect which the injured party's death
would have on the general rule that allows unlimited punitive damages.
3. 494 S.W.2d at 57.
4. Coonis v. Rogers, 429 S.W.2d 709, 716 (Mo. 1968); Beggs v. Univer-
sal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 409 S.W.2d 719, 724 (Mo. 1966).
5. § 537.330, RSMo 1969, states:
If any person shall maliciously or wantonly damage or destroy any per-
sonal property, goods, chattels, furniture or livestock, the person so
offending shall pay to the party injured double the value of the things
so damaged or destroyed ....
6. This statute is punitive because it calls for payment of damages in
excess of actual loss. Glick v. Ballentine Produce Inc., 396 S.W.2d 609, 616
(Mo. 1965); May v. Bradford, 369 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Mo. 1963); Contestible v.
Brookshire, 355 S.W.2d 36, 42 (Mo. 1962).
7. Two similar statutes, §§ 537.340-.350, RSMo 1969, have been inter-
preted. § 537.340 deals with trespassory damage to trees, timber, or parts of
realty, and requires the offending party to pay treble damages to the injured
party. Walther v. Warner, 26 Mo. 143 (1858), and Tackett v. Huesman, 19
Mo. 525 (1854), held that this statute did not preempt the common law
remedy and that, in any case, the statutory remedy must be pleaded. Section
537.350 requires a person removing another's fences to pay double damages.
Albi v. Reed, 281 S.W.2d 882, 886 (Mo. 1955), held that the statute did not
preempt the common law remedy.
8. 494 S.W.2d at 59.
9. Chappell v. City of Springfield, 423 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Mo. 1968);
Beggs v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 409 S.W.2d 719, 724 (Mo. 1966); Peak
v. W.T. Grant Co., 886 S.W.2d 685, 693 (K.C. Mo. App. 1964); State ex rel.
Boswell v. Curtis, 334 S.W.2d 757, 761 (Spr. Mo. App. 1960).
10. Johnson v. Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 335 F. Supp. 390 (W.D. Mo. 1971);
Webrman v. Liberty Petroleum Co., 382 S.W.2d 56 (St. L. Mo. App. 1964).
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Missouri's property damage survival statute" does not mention punitive
damages.22 The union argued that Missouri should adopt the position of
several other states that regard punitive damages as strictly personal and
thus prohibit their recovery when the injured party is dead. 3 But, this posi-
tion ignores the purpose of imposing punitive damages, i.e., to punish the
wrongdoer and to deter others from engaging in similar conduct.1 4 The
supreme court held that the punitive damage portion of the administrator's
petition was neither strictly personal nor outside the scope of the Missouri
property damage survival statute.15
The pre-eminent issue in Greene was the effect of Missouri's wrongful
death statute.16 Recovery under that statute is normally limited to actual
pecuniary loss. In assessing damages, however, the jury may increase the
award above the pecuniary loss if it finds aggravating circumstances attend-
ing defendant's wrongful act.17 Although these excess damages are essen-
tially punitive in nature,18 Missouri courts have insisted that the concepts
of aggravated damages and punitive damages are different.19 Because the
difference is merely procedural,20 however, it is arguable that allowing both
11. § 537.010, RSMo 1969.
12. 537.010 provides:
For all wrongs done to property rights, or interest of another, for which
an action might be maintained against the wrongdoer, such action may
be brought by the person injured, or, after his death, by his executor
or administrator, against such wrongdoer, and, after his death, against
his executor or administrator, in the same manner and with like effect,
in all respects, as actions founded upon contracts.
13. Some of these prohibitions are statutory, such as R.I. GCN. LAws ANN.
§ 9-1-8 (1956). This statute allows survival of property damage claims, but the
personal representative can recover only actual damages. Punitive damages cannot
be awarded to the deceased's estate.
14. As expressed in Greene, "Logic dictates that if the wrongdoer may be
punished if his victim lives, then surely he should not escape retribution if his
wrongful act causes a death." 494 S.W.2d at 60, quoting Leahy v. Morgan, 275
F. Supp. 424, 425 (N.D. Iowa 1967).
15. 494 S.W.2d at 59-60.
16. § 537.080, RSMo 1969.
17. § 537.090, RSMo 1969 (now repealed), stated:
In every action brought under § 537.080, the jury may give to the
surviving party or parties who may be entitled to sue such damages, not
exceeding fifty thousand dollars, as the jury may deem fair and just for
the death and loss thus occasioned, with reference to the necessary
injury resulting from such death, and having regard for the mitigating
or aggravating circumstances attending the wrongful act, neglect or
default resulting in such death.
18. See note 6 supra.
19. See note 20 infra.
20. Substantively, punitive damages may be awarded only if the defendant
acted wilfully or wantonly. Warner v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 428 S.W.2d
596, 603 (Mo. 1968); Beggs v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 409 S.W.2d 719,
724 (Mo. 1966). Aggravated damages are awarded only if the deceased, had he
lived, would have been entitled to punitive damages. Dougherty v. Smith, 480
S.W.2d 519 (K.C. Mo. App. 1970). The only differences between the two are
that § 509.200, RSMo 1969 requires a prayer for punitive damages to be stated
separately in the petition, and § 510.270, RSMo 1969 requires the jury to state
the amount of a punitive award separately in the verdict. Neither requirement has
been applied to aggravated damages. Contestible v. Brookshire, 355 S.W.2d 36,
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when one act causes death, as well as property damage, would be a
double award. Ordinarily there can be no duplication of damages where,
as in Greene, there are two causes of action.21 This proposition is valid in
regard to actual damages because there are two separate injuries to be
redressed. This reasoning does not support recovery of punitive and
aggravated damages as retribution for a single act; to allow recovery of
both is to allow the jury to punish the defendant twice for a single act.22
The Greene court summarily rejected this argument by simply stating
that because there are two causes of action there could be no duplication
of damages.23
The court may have been prompted by the opportunity to avoid the
statutory $50,000 limit on wrongful death recoveries which governed the case
at that time.24 The court could also have been recognizing that Missouri's
exclusion of personal injury damages when the injured party dies from those
injuries 5 unjustly deprives the plaintiff of a considerable recovery.2
Significantly, the court acknowledged that the wrongful death action and
the survival action seek to redress different injuries and thus implied that
42 (Mo. 1962); Spaling v. Robertson, 357 Mo. 37, 48, 206 S.W.2d 517, 521(Mo. 1947). For a good discussion of the difference between aggravated and
punitive damages see Davis, Wrongful Death, 1973 WAsH. U. L. Q. 327, 347.
21. One action is for John Gaits wrongful death, the other is for the
destruction of Galt's personal property.
22. In the case of a wilful or wanton tort involving mass transit, a party can
logically be punished more than once for a single wrongful act because the wrong-
ful act is directed toward more than one plaintiff. In Greene, however, the defen-
dant is being punished twice because there is only one individual toward which
the wrongful act is directed.
23. 494 S.W.2d at 60. See also St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. v. Craft, 237 U.S.
648 (1915).
24. § 537.090, RSMo 1969. This statute has been repealed and replaced by
§ 537.090, RSMo 1974 Supp. The present statute removes the $50,000 limit on
wrongful death recoveries and allows the jury to consider aggravating or miti-
gating circumstances in awarding damages. The new statute reads:
In every action brought under section 537.080 the trier of the facts may
give to the party or parties entitled thereto such damages as will fairly
and justly compensate such party or parties for any damages he or they
have sustained and are reasonably certain to sustain in the future as a
direct result of such death. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances
attending the death may be considered by the trier of facts.
25. § 587.020, RSMo 1969, states:
Causes of actions for personal injuries, other than those resulting in
death, whether such injuries be to the health or to the person of the
injured party, shall not abate by reason of his death ....
This clause is interpreted to bar either the personal injury survival action or the
wrongful death action, depending upon the cause of death. Thus, the two actions
are mutually exclusive. Harris v. Goggins, 374 S.W.2d 6, 16 (Mo. En Bane 1963);
Plaza Express Co. v. Galloway, 365 Mo. 166, 172-73, 280 S.W.2d 17, 22
(Mo. 1955).
26. For example: A is injured by D's wrongful act. A lives for two weeks,
incurring $60,000 in medical expenses, lost wages, and pain and suffering, but
dies as a direct result of his injury. A's personal representative cannot recover any
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Missouri's exclusion policy is inappropriate.27 Since the right to bring a
personal property survival action is not contingent on the cause of death,28
the court has provided an additional source of damages with which he
may offset damages "lost" due to the exclusion of the personal injury
survival claim.29
JorN P. WEISENm.S
27. The court stated:
The wrongful death damages begin with the death of the person
wronged. The survival action damages end with the death of the person
wronged. There is no overlap or duplication of damages.
494 S.W.2d at 60.
28. See note 12 supra.
29. The wrongful death and property damage claims were settled with the
Teamster's Union for a reported $220,000. John Galt's widow received the
$50,000 statutory limit in the wrongful death settlement, and Galt's estate settled
the property damage claim for $170,000. Springfield Leader-Press, Oct. 25, 1973,
at 12, col. 4.
Judge Seiler, in writing the majority opinion, seems to admit that there is
some likelihood of clothing damage in every wrongful death case, but he points
out that Greene will not result in a rash of large recoveries because of the great
difficulty in proving that a defendant acted so carelessly as to be susceptible to a
punitive damages award. 494 S.W. 2d at 55.
The administrator cannot, of course, introduce evidence of personal injury
damages or present jury instructions on them in the property damage action.
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